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101 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
The conventional economic justification for global IP treaties begins from the
premise that nation-states, if left to their own devices, will rationally underinvest in innovation
incentives such as IP laws, grants, tax credits, and prizes (the “underinvestment hypothesis”).
Under this account, nation-states will free-ride on each other’s knowledge production unless
they find some solution to their collective-action problem. The solution that nation-states have
struck upon is international IP law: IP treaties harmonize domestic laws and thus ensure a
baseline level of investment in knowledge production (the “harmonization hypothesis”). And
since states are obligated by treaty to adopt strong IP laws, they steer away from tools such as
grants, credits, and prizes that are potentially more efficient mechanisms for encouraging
innovation. Previous authors have adopted this logic while lamenting its implications: IP
appears to be a necessary evil in an interconnected world—necessary to solve the free-rider
problem; lamentable because it results in sizeable deadweight losses.
This account of IP treaties is informative but incomplete. The underinvestment
hypothesis is robust only to the extent its assumptions about the nature of knowledge goods
and the behavior of nation-states are accurate. But not all knowledge goods are global public
goods, and nation-states have motivations to invest in knowledge production that the
conventional account fails to capture. More fundamentally, the harmonization hypothesis
rests on a misapprehension of the link between global and domestic IP laws. States can
comply with IP treaties while relying primarily on non-IP innovation incentives and non-price
mechanisms for allocating knowledge goods within their own borders. In the starkest case, a
government body subsidizes production of a knowledge good through prizes or grants, takes
title to the resulting IP rights, and then licenses the knowledge good to the government of
another nation-state. The government in the consumer nation-state has the option of
financing royalty payments to the producing country through taxation and then distributing
the knowledge good to its own citizens at marginal cost. In this stylized example, IP law
operates only at the international—not the domestic—level. While in practice states generally
choose to rely on IP at least to some extent, we show that many real-word arrangements
resemble the stylized example in important respects.
Our more nuanced account does not imply that international IP laws are misguided;
rather, our analysis highlights the specific function that IP treaties serve. Most significantly,
international IP laws establish a framework for setting the size of payments from states that
consume knowledge goods to states that produce those knowledge goods. At the same time,
international IP laws allow each signatory state to choose its own mix of innovation incentives
and its own method of allocating access to knowledge goods within its own borders. Put
differently, the international IP regime does not relegate nation-states to a subordinate
position in the production of knowledge goods; rather, it creates a framework in which nationstates still are dominant players in the innovation game.
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Introduction
Ever since Adam Smith, economists have recognized that nation-states
play an important role in subsidizing the production of knowledge goods.1 The
simple case for state subsidization goes as follows: Self-interested individuals and
firms will devote their time and money toward producing knowledge goods only
up to the point that the marginal benefit they reap from the investment exceeds
the marginal cost. Yet persons other than the producer also benefit from new
knowledge goods, and unless the producer takes the interests of these others into
account, she will invest less than the socially optimal amount. This is where
nation-states enter the picture. States can encourage the provision of knowledge
goods by enhancing the private rewards to producers or by reducing producers’
costs. By doing either (or both), nation-states can bring investment in knowledgegood provision closer to the socially optimal level.
Smith suggested that “the easiest and most natural way in which the state
can recompense” producers of knowledge goods is by granting them a “temporary
monopoly”—that is, a patent or copyright. 2 Intellectual property (IP) rights
enhance producers’ rewards by allowing them to charge higher prices. In this
respect, IP is akin to a tax on knowledge goods, with the revenues going to
knowledge-good producers. 3 But IP has a potentially undesirable feature: it
functions as a concentrated tax on a subset of goods. A concentrated tax is
generally less efficient than a uniform tax on all goods (or equivalently, a tax on
labor income).4 Accordingly, scholars of law and economics often describe IP as a
“second-best” mechanism for encouraging the provision of knowledge goods—
inferior to incentives financed through broad-based taxation.5
Notwithstanding this undesirable feature of IP, most nation-states do use
patents and copyrights to recompense producers of knowledge goods.6 But many
1 By “knowledge good,” we mean (appropriating economist Hal Varian’s definition) “anything that
can be digitized.” HAL VARIAN, MARKETS FOR INFORMATION GOODS 3 (1998). Books, blueprints,
films, and pharmaceutical formulas are all examples of knowledge goods. We use the term “nationstate” to distinguish national-level actors (our “nation-states”) from subnational actors (such as U.S.
states and Canadian provinces) as well as supranational actors (such as the United Nations and the
European Union). See, e.g., ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 26 (ECPR Press 2008) (1964).
2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. V,
ch. 1, ¶ 119 (1776).
3 See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 54 (2002); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 312–14, 371–73 (2013).
4 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 314–15. For a clear explanation of the equivalence between
a labor income tax and a uniform tax on all goods, see Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The
Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1417–1418 (2006).

See, e.g., Gene Grossman & Edwin L-C Lai, International Protection of Intellectual Property, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 1635, 1640 (2004); see also Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2014, at 131, 133 (“[M]any leading economists—including, most famously,
Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow—have suggested that the most efficient means to promote
information production involves not exclusion rights but public procurement.”). For a discussion of
compensating benefits of “user pays” incentives like IP, see Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 350-51.
6 Following the international IP literature, we consider copyright alongside patents. But as discussed
below, we are skeptical of how well the conventional economic account of IP treaties fits for creative
5
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nation-states simultaneously subsidize the production of knowledge goods through
other mechanisms, such as prizes, grants, and tax credits. 7 Nation-states also
support technological innovation by conducting research in-house, through
agencies such as the U.S. National Institutes of Health and the U.K. National
Physical Laboratory.8 States generally fund these non-IP mechanisms through
broad-based taxes rather than concentrated taxes on certain goods. 9 For this
reason, non-IP incentives in many circumstances may be more efficient than
patents and copyrights: they may yield the same output of knowledge goods while
generating less deadweight loss (and also posing fewer deterrents to cumulative
innovation).10
Yet the same characteristics of knowledge goods that give rise to the
argument for state subsidization also engender a challenge for nation-states that
seek to subsidize knowledge production in an interconnected world. First,
knowledge goods are generally nonrival: the fact that a person in another country
watches the same movie as you or uses the same drug does not decrease your
enjoyment of the good—and may even increase it. (Antibiotics are an
exception.11) Second, knowledge goods are only partially excludable: the producer
of a knowledge good cannot always prevent others from using the good without
payment. (Think unauthorized movie downloads and generic drugs.12) Where the
first characteristic (nonrivalry) is present, the global benefit from the production of
a new knowledge good is greater than the benefit to the citizens of any one nationstate. And where the second characteristic (nonexcludability) is present, citizens of
other countries can free-ride off the efforts of the nation-state that pays the
subsidy. Rational, self-interested nation-states will finance knowledge goods only
up to the point that the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit to their own
citizens. This means that absent international coordination, nation-states will
subsidize knowledge goods at less than the globally optimal level.13
works. Trade secrets, while not the focus here, serve similar functions to patents. See Mark A. Lemley,
The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008). Trademarks have
some limited similarities to public goods, see David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 22, 24 (2006), but are best justified on other grounds, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley
& Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 172 (2010).
7 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 310–26.
8 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Response, Tailoring Incentives: A Comment on Hemel and Ouellette’s
Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 131, 132 (2014).
9 Non-IP incentives could be financed through a sales tax on knowledge goods, which would lead to
the same inefficiency as the IP “tax.” See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 347; Benjamin Roin,
Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1058–59 (2014).
10 By “deadweight loss,” we mean the economic inefficiency that results from foregone transactions
when the price of a product exceeds its marginal cost. See N. GREGORY MANKIW & MARK P. TAYLOR,
MICROECONOMICS 301 (2006); see also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1059–64 (2005) (reviewing the costs of IP protection).
11 See infra note 30.
12 This is not to say that generics are costless to produce; rather, reverse engineering a drug and
relying on clinical trial data showing it is effective is simply far cheaper than producing this knowledge
in the first place. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make A Drug? Follow-on
Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299 (2010).
13 Of course, not all knowledge goods have these characteristics requiring state intervention. See infra
notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
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Notably, this prediction applies to IP and non-IP innovation incentives
alike. Absent coordination, rational self-interested nation-states will protect IP
only insofar as the marginal benefit to their citizens from additional IP protection
(in the form of increased innovation) exceeds the marginal cost (including
deadweight loss). Such states will apply a similar calculus when deciding how
much to subsidize the production of knowledge goods through broad-based
taxation. This is not to suggest that rational and self-interested nation-states will
offer no innovation inducements; rather, this logic suggests that state investment in
innovation will be suboptimal (though likely not zero).
But there is one important difference between IP and non-IP incentives
that alters this prediction. Most nation-states (162 in all) have signed and ratified
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
which requires all but the least-developed countries to protect IP at or above a
minimum level.14 That is, nation-states have responded to the collective-action
problem by virtually all agreeing to support the production of knowledge goods
through IP protection. There is no equivalent with respect to non-IP
mechanisms—no large-scale international agreement obligating nation-states to
pay for prizes, grants, tax credits, or in-house government research. The only
comprehensive solution to the problem of knowledge-goods provision that nationstates have struck is an IP solution.
The fact that nation-states have chosen to use international IP treaties—
rather than non-IP mechanisms—to coordinate their subsidies for knowledgegood production presents something of a puzzle: If IP protection yields greater
deadweight loss than non-IP innovation incentives, why have states settled upon
IP as a solution to their collective-action problem?15 Why not, say, a global treaty
requiring signatory states to allocate a percentage of gross domestic product to
research and development?16 Or why not, as Joseph Stiglitz has proposed, a global
prize fund financed by national governments that rewards innovators in targeted
fields (e.g., medical knowledge)?17
A possible answer is that a treaty focused on non-IP mechanisms is too
difficult to negotiate or enforce.18 We find this answer unsatisfactory. True, there
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197
[hereinafter
TRIPS];
see
Members
and
Observers,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Nov. 30, 2015);
Responding to Least Developed Countries’ Special Needs in Intellectual Property, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm (last updated Oct. 16, 2013).
15 Note that we are not asking “why” in the sense of seeking the stated motivations of the primary
actors involved in treaty negotiations. For a leading examination of the role of U.S. multinationals in
bringing TRIPS into being, see SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003). We are asking why these multinationals focused on IP
rather than an alternative rent-extraction tool, and why other nation-states were willing to sign on.

See, e.g., Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS
BIOLOGY 147 (2004).
17 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights, 333 BMJ 1279 (2006).
16

18 See, e.g., Rachel Kiddell-Monroe et al., Medical R&D Convention Derailed: Implications for the Global
Health System, 1 J. HEALTH DIPL. no. 1, June 12, 2013, http://www.ghd-net.org/abstracts/volume-1/2
(noting the breakdown in R&D treaty negotiations); Thomas Alured Faunce & Hitoshi Nasu, Three
Proposals for Rewarding Novel Health Technologies Benefiting People Living in Poverty. A Comparative Analysis of Prize
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is no multilateral institution capable of imposing a broad-based tax on an
international basis. But by the same token, there are no international courts
capable of enforcing IP law against private actors in different countries, and yet
nation-states nonetheless have been able to set up a global IP system. The
transaction costs of negotiating a global R&D treaty would be significant—and
the subsequent monitoring and enforcement costs even more so—but the same
can be said of any comprehensive international IP accord. And even if non-IP
mechanisms would entail higher administrative costs, that still leaves the question
of whether that administrative cost difference would exceed the greater
deadweight loss of proprietary pricing in an IP regime.
The previous paragraph assumed that deadweight loss in an IP system
exceeds deadweight loss under a non-IP alternative. That assumption is the basis
for the conventional critique of IP. While the assumption is credible in the
domestic IP context, the same assumption cannot be extended to the international
setting. Proprietary pricing for knowledge goods results in substantial deadweight
losses, but even the strongest international IP regime does not necessarily result in
proprietary pricing for knowledge goods at the domestic level. To be sure, the
global IP regime establishes a structure for setting the size of the rewards that
innovators can claim, and it requires states to establish an IP system as a default
reward system. But significantly, this default does not dictate the way that states
must incentivize knowledge production and allocate access to knowledge goods
within their own borders.
On the supply side of the knowledge-goods equation, international IP law
does not force states to adopt any one approach for incentivizing innovation.
States still can use non-IP mechanisms—prizes, grants, tax credits, and the like—
to encourage the production of knowledge. International IP law enables nationstates that subsidize the production of knowledge goods to seek compensation
from consumers elsewhere who benefit from those goods, but—at least as a formal
matter—international IP law still leaves states wide leeway with respect to internal
incentive structures. For example, a nation-state can require prize claimants to
relinquish their IP rights as a condition for receiving the prize—and the national
government can then keep for itself future revenues from licensing the knowledge
good abroad. Less directly but more commonly, nation-states can subsidize the
domestic production of knowledge goods through non-IP mechanisms such as
grants and credits and then can collect a share of overseas profits through taxation
of the domestic producer. Global IP law creates a framework for figuring out how
much State B must pay for knowledge goods generated in State A; it does not
determine the way that State A produces knowledge goods within that constraint.
On the allocation side, states can (and often do) choose non-price
mechanisms—funded through broad-based taxation—to distribute knowledge
goods at the domestic level. For instance, a nation-state that desires to distribute a
patented pharmaceutical to its own citizens at marginal cost can purchase a
license from the patentee and pay for the license through broad-based taxation.
Nation-states with single-payer health care systems generally follow a variant of
Funds, Health Impact Funds and a Cost-Effectiveness/Competitive Tender Treaty, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 146,
149 (2008) (discussing the challenges of implementing a global R&D treaty or prize fund).
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this approach, respecting the pharmaceutical maker’s IP rights while avoiding
domestic deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.19 And even in countries without
single-payer health care such as the United States, purchases of patented
pharmaceutical products are heavily subsidized by the government (e.g., through
Medicare Part D, Medicaid, and various health care-related tax expenditures). To
the extent that states do allow for access allocation through the mechanism of
price, that is only because states have not opted for non-price alternatives.
The common thread connecting the production and allocation stories—
and a point that IP scholars have overlooked until now—is that international IP
law and domestic policy are separable: nation-states that sign international IP
treaties such as TRIPS are not locked into IP-based mechanisms for incentivizing
innovation or allocating access to knowledge goods. Nation-states can choose to
encourage innovation through non-IP mechanisms, and they can decide to
distribute knowledge goods to their citizens at no cost or a discounted price. Even
though key features of IP law have been determined internationally, nation-states
remain central players in the provision of knowledge goods.
To be clear, we are not arguing that policymakers consciously conceive of
international IP in these terms. As scholars such as Susan Sell have documented,
the industrialized-country policymakers behind TRIPS were largely driven by
private corporate interests, and developing countries agreed to these minimum IP
standards based on promises of favorable trade terms.20 But even if our account
does not reflect the motivations of policymakers, we believe that our account does
describe the function that international IP actually serves. International IP sets a
framework for transfers from knowledge consumers to knowledge producers—and
within this framework, international IP allows nation-states to choose non-IP
mechanisms on the incentive side and the allocation side, and to recoup some of
the cross-border benefits of their non-IP investments.21 States that use IP at the
domestic level are not forced to do so by international law. They are free to
choose non-IP alternatives, whether or not they realize that they have this choice.
We explain and extend this insight further in the Article that follows, while
considering a range of counterarguments and qualifications. The Article proceeds
in four Parts. Part I presents a conventional economic narrative of international IP
treaties as the solution to a global public goods problem (drawing heavily from the
19 See infra notes 176–177 and accompanying text. Note, however, that states will only have full
autonomy to purchase IP rights and use alternative allocation mechanisms if they can be confident that
their investments will not be dispersed to consumers in other countries through international resale
markets. TRIPS does not currently dictate whether foreign sales exhaust domestic IP rights, TRIPS,
supra note 14, art. 6, and the Federal Circuit recently decided en banc to uphold the U.S. rule that
foreign sales do not exhaust U.S. patent rights, see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., No.
2014-1617, 2016 WL 559042 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2016). As we explain in a separate essay, reversal of
the current rule would undermine a key benefit of the current international system. Daniel J. Hemel &
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 17 (2016).
20 See SELL, supra note 15, at 96 (“In effect, twelve corporations made public law for the world.”); id.
at 110 (“[D]eveloping countries received promises of greatly expanded market access for their
agricultural products and textiles in exchange for agreeing to offer greater IP protection.”).
21 Cf. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS
145, 158 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3d ed. 2008) (arguing that “under a wide range of circumstances
individual firms behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns”).
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work of the late innovation economist Suzanne Scotchmer). 22 In short, this
account proceeds as follows: Knowledge is a global public good, so in the absence
of global coordination such as IP treaties, nation-states will rationally underinvest
in its production (the “underinvestment hypothesis”). Coordination through IP
treaties at the international level leads to harmonization of innovation policy at
the domestic level, and thus excessive reliance on IP relative to non-IP incentives
(the “harmonization hypothesis”). And yet IP treaties are the only plausible means
of international coordination due to the absence of a global public finance system
(the “uniqueness hypothesis”). We develop a formal economic model to illustrate
this account.
Part II draws on international political economy scholarship to show why
the underinvestment hypothesis is an incomplete explanation of state behavior.
The strength of the hypothesis depends on the robustness of its two premises: that
knowledge is a global public good and that states seek to maximize absolute gains.
Neither of those premises is universal. Knowledge is often not a pure public good,
and the extent to which it is a global public good depends on the dispersion of
demand for the knowledge good and the strength of positive local production
externalities. Moreover, international political economy scholars have presented a
number of alternatives to the absolute-gains model that seem to explain at least
some state investments in knowledge goods. These alternatives include a “realist”
model focused on relative gains and national security, a “constructivist” model
focused on the spread of behavioral norms, and a public choice model
emphasizing the role of actors below the state that may use R&D-related policies
as a way to extract rents. To be sure, our analysis does not imply that the
underinvestment hypothesis is categorically false. Rather, our analysis limits the
underinvestment hypothesis’s scope—and thus focuses attention on areas in which
international coordination will be most essential to knowledge production.23
This is where international IP treaties enter the narrative. Nation-states
have chosen to use international IP laws as a means of addressing the
underinvestment problem. The harmonization hypothesis holds that coordination
on IP at the international level necessarily leads states to use IP at the domestic
level. In Part III, we challenge that view. We develop the claim that international
and domestic innovation policy are separable. True, TRIPS and other
international IP agreements require signatory states to establish copyright and
patent systems that meet minimum standards. Moreover, international IP
agreements obligate signatory states to treat citizens of other signatories at least as
favorably as their own citizens. But these agreements still allow individual states to
adopt alternative non-IP arrangements for both the provision and allocation of
knowledge goods at the domestic level. Our analysis also adds a new insight to the
contentious debate over the Bayh-Dole Act and similar arrangements abroad,
which allow grant recipients to patent their publicly funded inventions.24 We
22 See Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
415 (2004).
23 For example, given the differing public choice dynamics in the patent and copyright contexts, we
think global underinvestment is far more likely to be a problem for technical rather than creative works.
24 See infra notes 161, 169–174 and accompanying text.
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explain that Bayh-Dole regimes have the overlooked benefit of allowing nationstates to internalize some of the foreign benefits of their non-IP investments in
innovation, thereby increasing incentives for such investments in the first place.25
Part IV then turns to the uniqueness hypothesis—the claim that IP is the
only mechanism for incentivizing innovation that can be scaled to the global level.
While it is true that there is no global public finance system, there is also no global
court system for enforcing IP rights. To be sure, treaties such as TRIPS have set
up institutions for resolving cross-border IP disputes, but one can imagine similar
structures with respect to other innovation-incentive mechanisms. Rather than
relying on the uniqueness hypothesis to justify the international IP regime, we
argue that the most compelling justification for IP treaties is that they give each
state some freedom to choose the domestically optimal set of innovation incentives
and allocation mechanisms while also ensuring that production costs will be
shared among states in rough proportion to the benefits they derive from
knowledge goods. Moreover, the international IP regime effectively caps the size
of transfers from consumer nation-states to producer nation-states: no state must
pay for knowledge goods it does not use, and no state must pay more than the sum
total of the benefits that accrue to its citizens. Counterintuitively, the strongest
arguments in favor of the international IP regime may rest on grounds of domestic
autonomy and distributive justice—the very grounds on which international IP
laws are commonly criticized.26
Finally, we consider the implications of our argument for the debate over
domestic innovation incentives. A common concern is that states that subsidize
the production of knowledge goods through non-IP channels cannot claim partial
compensation from other consumer states. For example, Suzanne Scotchmer
described the efficiency gains from IP treaties while lamenting the result of “too
much intellectual property” relative to non-IP incentives. 27 But as we show,
nation-states that subsidize innovation through prizes, grants, and tax credits can
internalize the benefits conferred upon foreign consumers to the same extent as
states that rely on IP. The international IP regime—perhaps surprisingly—serves
as the mechanism through which nation-states can recoup some of the positive
externalities that they generate through non-IP investments. In other words, our
(qualified) defense of the international IP regime is not an argument for reliance
on IP at the domestic level. To the contrary, our observations regarding
international IP suggest that innovation policy possibilities at the domestic level
are broader than is often believed.

25 We discuss this theory in more detail in a separate article. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders (unpublished manuscript).
26 This is not a defense of the current global distribution of the costs of knowledge goods; we would
favor broadening the current TRIPS exemption for least-developed countries. But we think the current
system sets a reasonable framework for transfers among wealthier countries, and it is not obvious that
poor countries would fare better under a non-IP coordination system (and they might fare much worse).
27 Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 415.
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I. IP Treaties as the Solution to a Global Public Goods
Problem
This Part sets forth a conventional economic account of IP treaties as the
solution to a global public goods problem. We begin in Section I.A by describing
the relative substitutability of IP and non-IP innovation incentives from the
perspective of a single nation-state. Section I.B turns to the problem of producing
knowledge on the global scale. Section I.C then explains how IP treaties may solve
this global public goods problem.
A. Choices in State Support for Knowledge Production
Introductory IP casebooks often begin by explaining that patent and
copyright laws increase incentives for information production, and thus allow for
more efficient provision of knowledge goods by the private sector.28 As IP scholars
have realized, there are a number of caveats to this account. Most obviously, IP
sacrifices static efficiency for dynamic efficiency. IP increases the production of
knowledge goods by making them more excludable, thereby increasing dynamic
efficiency, but this benefit comes at the cost of pricing nonrival goods above their
marginal cost of zero, which reduces static efficiency.29 Information is also rarely a
pure public good. Knowledge goods are often excludable even without IP,30 and

See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 18–20 (7th ed. 2012); ROBERT MERGES, PETER MENELL & MARK
LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 12 (6th ed. 2012). Describing
the public-good nature of knowledge as a justification for awarding IP rights has a long history. See, e.g.,
JEREMY BENTHAM, A Manual of Political Economy, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 31, 71 (John
Bowring ed., 1843), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1922 (“He who has no hope that he
shall reap, will not take the trouble to sow. But that which one man has invented, all the world can
imitate. Without the assistance of the laws, the inventor would almost always be driven out of the
market . . . .”).
28

29 See Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive–Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation & Copyright
Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1849–50 (2014) (arguing that IP should thus be described as addressing
only an “appropriability problem” rather than a “public goods problem”). A good is nonexcludable if
no one can be excluded from its benefits, and it is nonrival if its consumption by one user does not
detract from its utility for other users (that is, there is zero marginal cost to consumption). See PAUL
KRUGMAN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 279–80 (2d ed. 2010). If a good is nonexcludable but
rival (e.g., common pool resources such as biodiversity), consumers can free-ride on anyone who does
pay, leading to inefficiently low production. Id. at 280. If a good is nonrival but excludable (e.g., payper-view movies), private firms can profit by supplying it, but setting a price greater than zero leads to
inefficiently low consumption. Id.
30 See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE
L.J. 1900, 1903 (2013). Although Kapczynski and Syed frame their discussion as a critique of patents,
we see no a priori reason to believe that patents increase the variance in the fraction of social value that
inventors can capture. In the absence of patents, inventors could still resort to secrecy, and patents can
level the playing field between inventions that are easy to keep secret and those that are not.

There is less variability in information’s nonrivalry, but some information may decrease in value
with use. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
471, 487–88 (2003) (arguing that if anyone could use Mickey Mouse, “the value of the character might
plummet” because “the public would rapidly tire of” him); Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain:
Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67 (2005)
(describing antibiotic resistance, which seems to us a clear example of rival patentable knowledge).
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many such goods will be provided without state action,31 particularly as the costs
of production plummet in many industries. 32 Furthermore, creating property
rights in information is only one of many ways to compensate providers of
knowledge goods. Alternatively, states can subsidize the production of knowledge
goods through prizes, grants, and tax incentives (such as tax credits for R&D and
special deductions for qualified artists33).
In previous work, we have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of
these various mechanisms from the perspective of a single nation-state. 34 We
explained that no one incentive (or mix of incentives) strictly dominates for all
forms of knowledge production; rather, optimal innovation policy is context
specific. IP is particularly well suited to cases in which capital markets operate
efficiently, potential innovators are risk-neutral, and the relevant knowledge good
is considered a luxury. In all cases, the choice of innovation incentive will depend
on the nature of the knowledge goods in question and on the society’s goals and
distributional preferences.35
From the perspective of the state, one of the key distinctions between IP
and other knowledge-production incentives is that IP-mediated transfers to artists
and innovators are for the most part not reflected in government budgets. The
higher prices on IP-protected goods can be considered a “shadow” tax—
31 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012) (describing industries in which innovation has flourished with
relatively little state intervention); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257 (2007) (describing the social benefits of non-internalized spillovers). But there is little serious
challenge to the claim that many knowledge goods will not be produced without some state-facilitated
transfer to the producer, and our argument is focused on those cases.
32 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 99–106 (2006).
33 Performing artists can claim a deduction for unreimbursed expenses even when they take the
standard deduction, while employees in most other lines of work only can claim a deduction for
unreimbursed employee expenses if they itemize on their tax returns. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 62(a)(1), (a)(2)(B).
34 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3. Although our prior work focused on incentives for patentable
knowledge, our framework also applies to other knowledge goods such as artistic works, though the
dimensions of our framework suggest that optimal incentives will look very different for most creative
works than for technical inventions. For an example of a tax incentive for creative works, see I.R.C.
§ 62(a)(2)(B), which allows deductions for a “qualified performing artist.” For federal grant opportunities
for artists, see Grants, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, http://arts.gov/grants (last visited Jan. 24,
2016). Governments also use tax incentives to support movie production. See, e.g., Paul Krekorian, To
Keep ‘Hollywood’ in Hollywood, Tax Incentives Are Key, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2014, available at
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-krekorian-film-tax-credit-20140714-story.html;
Etan
Vlessing, Mark Wahlberg to Canada: Restore Film Tax Breaks for Hollywood, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 5,
2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/mark-wahlberg-canada-restore-film-398637. See also
infra note 67 (noting other grants and tax incentives for the arts).
35 In short, we argued that every state transfer to spur knowledge production embodies the answers
to three questions: (1) Who decides the size of the transfer? Does the state tailor the reward on a projectby-project basis (as with direct spending and fixed prizes)? Or does it simply establish technologyneutral ground rules (as with IP and tax incentives), which leverage private information about potential
projects? (2) When does the transfer occur? Only ex post to successful projects (as with prizes and IP),
providing a strong incentive for success? Or are projects funded before their results are known (as with
grants and tax incentives), which might be more effective when producers are risk averse and capital
constrained? (3) Who pays? Do all taxpayers fund the transfer (as with grants, prizes, and tax incentives),
or only users of the resulting information (as with IP)? We argue that whether “user pays” is normatively
attractive will vary with the technology, and that in theory, “user pays” could be incorporated into other
reward mechanisms. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 327–52.
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equivalent to a targeted sales tax on these goods—and IP laws can be viewed as
“shadow” expenditures that transfer these rewards to producers. 36 The other
mechanisms, in contrast, are funded through conventional public finance. From
the consumer’s perspective, of course, there is little difference between paying
$100 in higher prices on IP-protected products and paying $100 in higher taxes
that are used to fund mechanisms such as prizes, grants, and tax credits.37 But the
interchangeability of IP and other transfer mechanisms depends on the existence
of a state that can use conventional public finance mechanisms. In the global
context, there is no single worldwide governance body that has authority to
impose taxes, and thus no straightforward way to replicate the effect of IP through
a tax-and-spend regime.
B. The Global Challenge: Uncompensated Externalities and FreeRiding
As we explained in the Introduction, the same public-goods nature of
knowledge goods that justifies state subsidies in the first place also implies that
nation-states cannot solve the knowledge-goods problem on their own. Thus,
discussions of international IP law often begin with a similar story of externalities
as the one that justifies domestic IP laws, except that it is states rather than private
firms that fail to optimally invest in producing knowledge goods.38
There are at least two distinct accounts of why global investment in
knowledge goods will be suboptimal, and the two accounts are worth teasing apart
(for reasons that will become apparent below39). Under the first account, which we
will refer to as the “free-rider problem,” each state strategically considers the likely
actions of others in setting its own knowledge-good subsidies. As explained by
economists Gene Grossman and Edwin Lai, in a “trading world with many
countries,” all “are inclined to allow others to provide the incentives for
36

Id. at 312–13, 371–73.

As currently implemented, non-IP incentives tend to be funded through broad-based taxation in
which users cross-subsidize each others’ knowledge goods, but as we’ve explained, this is a distinct third
dimension in innovation policy space. Id. at 327–52. The administrative costs of each system also will
vary with implementation; for estimates of current costs in the United States, see id. at 361–67.
37

38 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, THOMAS COTTIER & FRANCIS GURRY, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 93 (2007) (beginning the section on
“Policies Underlying the International IPRs System” with Joseph Stiglitz’s argument that knowledge is a
global public good); MARGO A. BAGLEY, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & JAY A. ERSTLING, INTERNATIONAL
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 19, 21 (2013) (stating that the “dominant justification for strong global
intellectual property rights” is based on efficient international trade, in that if “China winks at piracy of
computer programs and compact discs” then “much less incentive exists to produce the product in the
first place”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 97 (3d ed. 2012) (noting the conventional argument “that worldwide
research and development investment probably falls short of its socially optimal level, and that weak
protection of intellectual property rights in developing countries aggravates this important problem,”
but questioning whether “developing countries should pay the price for increased” IP). In the earliest
(pre-TRIPS) extended economic treatment of international patent agreements, Edith Penrose noted
that they are beneficial only to the extent they increase innovation, though she was skeptical at that time
that foreign patents would provide much incentive to innovators. EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 127–29 (1951).
39 See infra notes 215-221 and accompanying text.
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innovation so as to avoid the deadweight losses in their home markets.”40 In other
words, there are some global public goods for which the payoffs seem to present a
multi-player prisoners’ dilemma, with each nation-state having an incentive to
free-ride on the production of that good by other states.41 In such circumstances,
Grossman and Lai conclude, “a patent treaty is critical for creating incentives for
private innovation.”42
This is not to say that trade necessarily leads nation-states to invest less in
knowledge production. While the possibility that knowledge goods will move
across borders may give rise to the risk of free-riding, it also may increase the
marginal benefit of additional investment in R&D. This is so even if producer
states have no way to recapture the benefits from knowledge goods consumed
elsewhere. Access to knowledge generated by Japanese researchers likely increases
the productivity of U.S. researchers (and vice versa). When the United States
decides whether to invest in a particular project, the movement of knowledge
goods across borders has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, the payoff
from such investment may be larger when U.S. researchers can stand on the
shoulders of giants elsewhere. On the other hand, the United States may have an
incentive to step back and allow other countries to take the lead.
The free-rider account is distinct from a second account of
underinvestment in IP: the “uncompensated externalities problem.” This problem
arises when each nation-state sets its subsidies for knowledge-good provision
independently and non-strategically, but still fails to account for positive
externalities generated by its own innovation effort. Suzanne Scotchmer explained
that states “have deficient incentives to invest, relative to what is efficient,”
because of “uncompensated externalities abroad.” 43 Similarly, in the legal
literature, John Duffy has argued that positive “externalities provide a particularly
powerful justification for transnational patent harmonization.” 44 (As discussed
further below, we think this account is largely accurate insofar as knowledge goods
are global public goods and nation-states seek to maximize absolute gains, though
we also note the account’s limits.)
Of course, both effects can occur simultaneously: a nation-state may
underinvest in provision of a particular knowledge good both because it fails to
account for external benefits and because it expects to free-ride off the provision of

40 Grossman & Lai, supra note 5, at 1650; see also Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and
Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 510
(1996) (“[S]ince patents are territorial, some countries may decide that they can win by free-riding on
the patented technology developed elsewhere without substantially slowing the march of technological
development. In this way, their societies are advantaged, although if everybody adopted this strategy,
societies worldwide would lose out as technological advancement slowed.”).
41 For the payoffs to resemble a prisoners’ dilemma, all that is necessary is that the cost to an
individual country of producing the good is greater than the benefit to that country but less than the
global benefit. See 3 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 1271–72
(R.J. Barry Jones ed., 2001).
42 Grossman & Lai, supra note 5, at 1650.
43 Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 415, 420.
44 John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 695 (2002).
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that knowledge good by its neighbor. 45 But we think it is worth explicitly
disentangling these accounts because they will apply in different situations, and
they lend themselves to different solutions.46 For now, however, the important
point is that under the standard economic account, nation-states will underinvest
in knowledge-good provision unless they can find some way to coordinate their
efforts.
C. The IP Solution
In theory, nation-states could address the problem of underinvestment in
knowledge goods by coordinating on any of the mechanisms discussed in Section
I.A. In practice, however, IP has emerged as the primary solution to this global
coordination dilemma. In the conventional economic account, treaties such as
TRIPS help solve the underprovision problem by requiring states to contribute to
the extent that they use the technical knowledge and creative works produced
under IP laws.
Efforts at multilateral coordination on IP date to the 1880s, when
numerous nations negotiated the Berne Convention on copyright law and the
Paris Convention on patent and trademark law, which are administered by an
organization now known as the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO).47 These agreements required some minimum level of IP protection (e.g.,
the Berne Convention set a minimum copyright term of life-of-the-author plus
fifty years48), and they established the norm of “national treatment”—that every
member must give nationals of other members treatment no less favorable than
their own. 49 As Graeme Dinwoodie notes, “[t]his basic structure—national
treatment plus substantive minima—has persisted throughout the twentieth
century,” with the minimum IP standards gradually being “revised upwards” from
their initially “undemanding levels.”50
The most significant upward revision came when TRIPS was negotiated
in 1994 through the World Trade Organization (WTO). 51 The heightened
45 Scholars of international IP sometimes mention both effects without distinguishing them. See, e.g.,
Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of
Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 285 (2004) (mentioning uncompensated externalities and
the choice of countries to “logically free ride on foreign R&D” as part of the same “main reason” that
“countries would tend to protect new technology and product development at a level that is lower than
would be globally optimal”).
46 See infra notes 215-218 and accompanying text.

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at
Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised
at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter
Paris Convention]; see WIPO—A Brief History, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/history.html (last visited Jan 24, 2016).
48 Berne Convention, supra note 47, art. 7(1).
49 Berne Convention, supra note 47, art. 5(1); Paris Convention, supra note 47, art. 2(1).
50 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 993, 995 (2002).
51 TRIPS, supra note 14. For an account of how nation-states jockey for favorable forums for IP
treaty negotiations—and an important reminder of how messily economic theories play out in the real
47
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standards of TRIPS must be met by every WTO member nation, which now
includes most of the world (including every high-income country).52 For example,
TRIPS requires countries to offer twenty-year patents “in all fields of technology”
and to have trade secret laws that protect certain “undisclosed information.”53
More recently, countries including the United States have pushed for further
increases in global IP protection through bilateral and multilateral agreements,
including the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), signed in 2011 (but
then rejected by the European Parliament), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), on which participants reached agreement in October 2015 after
contentious negotiations (but which may still fail during ratification).54
To be sure, not all scholars agree that the upward ratcheting of IP
protection under TRIPS and other agreements has been a positive development.
TRIPS has been criticized for impeding access to knowledge and development,55
for having been unfairly imposed on developing countries, 56 and for limiting
policy experimentation and regulatory competition.57 Some commentators have
argued that TRIPS should be supplemented or replaced by different global R&D
agreements. For example, Joseph Stiglitz has argued that “basic research and
many other fundamental forms of knowledge are not, and almost certainly should
not be protected by an intellectual property regime,” and therefore “[i]n these
areas efficiency requires public support,” which “must be at the global level.”58
There have also been calls for supplemental R&D treaties in the public health59
world—see Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).
52 See Members and Observers, supra note 14.
53 TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 27(1), 33, 39. For an overview of other changes, see J.H. Reichman,
Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement,
29 INT’L LAW. 345 (1995).
54 See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011).
55 See, e.g., ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Gaëlle Krikorian &
Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010); MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO THE GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006); Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or
Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47 (2003); Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A
Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009); Jerome
H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a
Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 94 (2007).
56 See, e.g., SELL, supra note 15; Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion Part II: Back to the Past
or a Small Step Forward?, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185.
57 See, e.g., GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF
TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (2012); Duffy,
supra note 44; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015).
58 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 320 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
59 Tim Hubbard and James Love advocate an “R&D contribution norm, established by treaty.”
Hubbard & Love, supra note 16, at 150. Under the Health Impact Fund proposed by Aidan Hollis and
Thomas Pogge, pharmaceutical manufacturers could opt in to a global prize scheme, for which they
propose a minimum funding level of $6 billion (allocated based on gross national income). AIDAN
HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR
ALL 43 (2008), available at http://healthimpactfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/hif_book.pdf.
For similar arguments in favor of a global health R&D treaty, see Nicoletta Dentico & Nathan Ford,
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and climate60 arenas. But these critiques generally do not challenge the dominant
narrative that international coordination is necessary; rather, they argue for nonIP forms of collective action. Stiglitz is clear, for instance, that “[k]nowledge is a
global public good” and that “global public goods provide a central rationale for
international collective action.”61
Despite these critiques of TRIPS and calls for global R&D treaties, IP
might seem like the most natural solution to the collective-action problem facing
nation-states because there is no world government that can set global taxes to
support conventional public finance mechanisms. Scotchmer argued that states
coordinate on IP due to the lack of “institutions to harmonize public spending.”62
She elaborated that “[t]here is no analogous institution [to IP treaties] for making
public sponsors account for cross-border spillovers.”63
Scotchmer was not, however, pleased with what she saw as the inevitable
implication of this necessary global coordination on IP, which she summarized as
follows:
[H]armonization [of global IP laws] will not solve all the efficiency
problems that arise from independent policy making. Perhaps the
most important problem arises when we recognize that for some
investments, public spending is the most efficient way to fund
R&D. . . . But since public funding agencies will not be inclined to
take account of benefits generated abroad, the incentives to
provide public spending will be deficient. In contrast, harmonized
intellectual property protections allow countries to recoup some of
the benefits they confer on foreign consumers. This may lead to an
international system that relies more heavily on intellectual
property than is efficient, especially when it is recognized that
public spending on R&D is an extensive and efficient practice.64
In sum, the account of global IP treaties presented above proceeds as
follows: Knowledge is a global public good, so nation-states will necessarily
underinvest in its production unless there is coordination at the global level (which
The Courage to Change the Rules: A Proposal for an Essential Health R&D Treaty, 2 PLOS MED. e14 (2005); and
Suerie Moon et al., Innovation and Access to Medicines for Neglected Populations: Could a Treaty Address a Broken
Pharmaceutical R&D System?, 9 PLOS MED. e1001218 (2012). Movement toward a global health R&D
treaty at the World Health Organization has been unsuccessful. See CONSULTATIVE EXPERT WORKING
GRP. ON RESEARCH & DEV., WORLD HEALTH ORG., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO MEET
HEALTH NEEDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING GLOBAL FINANCING AND
COORDINATION (2012), available at http://www.who.int/phi/CEWG_Report_5_April_2012.pdf
(recommending a binding instrument for health R&D funding); Kiddell-Monroe et al., supra note 18
(describing the derailment of this process).
See, e.g., Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and “Breakthrough Technologies,” 96 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 25
(2006); Daniel Bodansky, Climate Commitments: Assessing the Options, in BEYOND KYOTO 37, 43 (Joseph E.
Aldy et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/Beyond%20Kyoto.pdf; Heleen de
Coninck, International Technology-Oriented Agreements to Address Climate Change, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 335 (2008).
61 Stiglitz, supra note 58, at 320.
62 Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 415.
63 Id. at 420.
64 Id. at 436.
60
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we refer to as the “underinvestment hypothesis”). Global coordination on IP
dictates how states incentivize innovation and allocate knowledge goods
domestically, leading to reliance on IP at the expense of other mechanisms such as
prizes, grants, and tax credits (the “harmonization hypothesis”). And IP is the only
plausible solution for this collective-action problem due to the lack of a global
public finance system to support other mechanisms such as grants, prizes, and tax
incentives (the “uniqueness hypothesis”).
In the following three Parts, we argue that each step of this logic is
incomplete. But first, we restate the classical economic account in formal terms so
that each step in the logic can be rendered more precise.
D. A Formal Economic Model
We begin with a rudimentary model featuring some number of states—SA,
SB, SC, and so on—each of which is a potential producer and potential consumer
of knowledge goods. Let x be the level of investment in production of the relevant
knowledge good. Let BA(x) be the benefit to consumers in SA from investment of x
in the relevant good assuming that the good is freely available to consumers in SA;
let BB(x) be the benefit to consumers in SB from investment of x in the good (again
assuming free availability), and so on, such that Bglobal is the sum of all Bs for all
nation-states. Finally, let C(x) represent the cost of investing x. Assume that
investment in the production of the knowledge good is subject to the law of
diminishing marginal returns, such that B'(x) > 0 and B''(x) < 0.
From a global welfare perspective, the optimal level of investment (xglobal*)
occurs when Bglobal'(xglobal*) = C'(xglobal*), which is when the marginal benefit from
any additional investment equals the marginal cost. However, SA only has an
incentive to invest up to xA* such that BA'(xA*) = C'(xA*). If BA < Bglobal, then xA* <
xglobal*. SA may even invest less than xA* if it suspects that it can rely on investments
by other countries, but if BA is the largest Bi, no individual country will have an
incentive to increase total global investment beyond xA*. Total global investment
will thus be below the global optimum.
States can address this inefficiency by establishing a mechanism whereby
consumer states will compensate SA when a knowledge good produced in SA is
consumed elsewhere. So, for example, if diabetes patients in SB benefit from a
good generated in SA, the patients or the government of SB will make a payment to
an SA-based firm. (The payment will go directly to the government of SA if the
relevant patent is state-owned; otherwise, the government of SA will claim a
portion of the payment through taxation of the firm.) Let TBàA represent the
transfer payment that SB (or its citizens) makes to SA (or an SA-based firm) as partial
compensation to SA for developing the relevant knowledge good.
The international IP regime serves as a mechanism for setting TBàA. If a
knowledge good is produced in SA and demand for the good exists among SB’s
citizens, SB cannot simply appropriate the knowledge good for its own use; it must
compensate SA. In the absence of a licensing agreement, SB must allow SA to sell
the knowledge good to consumers in SB at a monopoly price (the monopoly being
conferred by IP law). Let PB|monopoly be the profits that SA (or the SA-based firm) will
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earn from selling the knowledge good at a monopoly price in SB, and let
BB|monopoly(x) be the benefit to consumers in SB from access to the good at a
monopoly price. Absent perfect price discrimination, some consumers in SB who
could benefit from the good will be unwilling or unable to pay the monopoly
price; thus, BB|monopoly(x) < BB(x), and TBàA = PB|monopoly < BB|monopoly(x). If the SA-based
firm can price-discriminate perfectly, then TBàA = PB|monopoly = BB|monopoly(x) = BB(x).
We return to this model below. But first, we interrogate key assumptions
underlying the model—namely, that states are rational actors and that knowledge
goods are global public goods.

II. Why Do Nation-States Invest in Knowledge Production?
The public-goods framework presented in Part I predicts that without an
international coordination mechanism, nation-states will underinvest in
knowledge goods. Testing this prediction is virtually impossible: to say that states
“underinvest” in knowledge goods, we would have to know the optimal amount of
public investment in knowledge goods. That amount is, of course, unknown (and
likely unknowable). Moreover, the underinvestment hypothesis generated by the
public-goods framework is not falsified by the fact that states do invest in
information production beyond what international agreements require; after all,
the public-goods framework predicts underinvestment rather than no investment.
We can observe that in practice, there are tremendous state transfers to
information producers beyond what is required by international law. In 2010, for
instance, the governments of seven countries—the United States, France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Japan, and South Korea—spent more
than $272 billion in the aggregate on direct R&D support (not including tax
incentives).65 This direct support for R&D comes on top of the indirect subsidy for
R&D required by international IP law. Indeed, we have estimated that the size of
the patent “shadow tax” in the United States is likely less than the direct R&D
spending supported by federal tax dollars.66 Governments also spend significant
sums to encourage creative works. 67 Again, this does not disprove the

65 See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2014, at app. tbl.4-14, available
at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/content/chapter-4/at04-14.pdf.
66 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 320-21, 371-72.
67 In the mid-1990s, direct public expenditure on the arts in the United States was about $1.5 billion
per year, which was substantially less per capita than in many other industrialized nations: Germany
spent $6.9 billion, France spent $3.3 billion, the United Kingdom spent $1.5 billion, and Canada spent
$1.3 billion. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, International Data on Government Spending on the Arts
(Research Division Note #74, Jan. 2000) (manuscript at 9 tbl.1), available at
http://arts.gov/sites/default/files/74.pdf. Classifying “the arts” is difficult; these estimates did not
include spending on libraries, arts training, capital expenditures (e.g., building a new theater), or tax
incentives. Id. at 2. Lea Shaver notes that public support for book provision includes support for
universities that employ and train many authors, direct purchase of textbooks by education departments
(or by students using public financial aid), and purchases of books by libraries—which alone costs
taxpayers a billion dollars per year in the United States. Lea Shaver, The Right to Read, 54 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 51 (2015). Cultural production is also supported through tax incentives. See NAT’L
ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HOW THE UNITED STATES FUNDS THE ARTS 18–24 (3d ed. 2012),
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underinvestment hypothesis, but it may cause one to question whether the
conventional economic account fully captures the reasons why states invest in
innovation.
Recall that the underinvestment hypothesis rests on two premises:
(1) knowledge is a global public good, and (2) nation-states rationally underinvest
in global public goods. The plausibility of the underinvestment hypothesis
depends on the validity of those two premises. While we cannot test the
underinvestment hypothesis by comparing actual investment to optimal
investment (because we cannot determine the latter figure), we can evaluate the
robustness of the premises on which the hypothesis rests. We do so in this Part.
We have already noted that knowledge is rarely a pure public good.68 In
Section II.A, we consider the extent to which knowledge is in fact a global public
good. We suggest that “globalness” is a matter of degree: while demand for some
knowledge goods is dispersed across countries, demand for other knowledge goods
is highly concentrated in one or a small number of locations. We also consider
evidence that the production of knowledge goods yields positive local production
externalities: in this respect, knowledge production is an activity that generates
distinct local and global benefits. We argue that the strength of the
underinvestment hypothesis varies with the dispersion of demand and the
magnitude of positive local production externalities: when demand is highly
concentrated and positive local production externalities are significant, nationstates will rationally invest in knowledge production at close to optimal levels.
In Section II.B, we examine the second premise on which the
underinvestment hypothesis rests: the claim that nation-states—as self-interested
rational actors—will underinvest in the production of global public goods. For
decades, scholars of domestic and political economy have debated whether
nation-states are in fact self-interested rational actors. One variant of the rationalactor model, “realism,” posits that nation-states are engaged in a competition with
each other for security, and that they seek to maximize relative (rather than
absolute) gains. Realism is especially helpful for understanding state spending on
knowledge goods related to national-security concerns (such as the substantial
spending on the space race), but the realist approach also suggests that states may
have incentives to invest in knowledge goods with no immediate defense
application. An alternative to the rational-actor model, “constructivism,” sees
states as actors whose identities and interests are constructed by social
interactions. In the constructivist model, states do not single-mindedly seek
material gains; rather, their actions are shaped by behavioral norms, such as the
norm that spending on science is something that states are “supposed to do.”
Finally, public choice theory (along with its international-political-economy
cousin, “liberal intergovernmentalism”) focuses on actors below the state, such as
domestic interest groups that may seek to extract rents through R&D-related
policies.
available at http://arts.gov/sites/default/files/how-the-us-funds-the-arts.pdf; see also supra note 34
(discussing additional tax incentives).
68 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
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Unsurprisingly, these different perspectives yield different conclusions as to
why states invest in knowledge production—and different predictions as to
whether investment will approach optimal levels. What they all suggest is that the
conventional account in the IP literature overlooks important dimensions of the
knowledge-production problem. This is not to imply that international IP treaties
are unnecessary; rather, our analysis of the underinvestment hypothesis is aimed
at identifying the conditions under which the conventional economic account will
be most applicable.
A. Is Knowledge a Global Public Good?
As noted above, the underinvestment hypothesis proceeds from the
premise that knowledge is a global public good. A global public good, like other
public goods, is nonrival and nonexcludable.69 The distinguishing feature of a
global public good is that its benefits transcend national borders. IP scholars often
state categorically that information and knowledge are global public goods.70 In
this Section, we examine the extent to which benefits from knowledge goods—
benefits from consumption and from positive production externalities—are in fact
global.
1. Dispersion of Demand
For some knowledge goods, demand is largely domestic. And with respect
to these goods, the coordination challenges outlined in Part I are less daunting.
Consider the cranberry. Over three-quarters of the world’s cranberries are grown
in the United States,71 and nearly three-quarters of U.S.-grown cranberries are
consumed domestically.72 So questions related to the health effects of cranberries
are primarily of concern to U.S. producers and consumers—other countries that
don’t produce or consume cranberries in significant quantities have much less
interest in the issue.73 Unsurprisingly, the United States is the only country that
has invested significantly in cranberry-related R&D: the U.S. National Institutes
of Health has targeted cranberry-related research as a funding priority since
2005.74 Cranberry-related knowledge appears to be nonrival and nonexcludable
69

See supra note 29.

See, e.g., Dana Dalrymple, Scientific Knowledge as a Global Public Good: Contributions to Innovation and the
Economy, in NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND
INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 35, 36 (2003); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 121, 156 (“[R]ecent scholarship in economics and law . . . identifies knowledge as a global
public good.”); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693,
1714 (2008) (“[K]nowledge is a global public good . . . .”).
71
See
FAOStat,
FOOD
&
AGRIC.
ORG.
OF
THE
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://faostat3.fao.org/browse/Q/QC/E (last visited Jan 24, 2016) (select “Cranberries”).
70

72 See Tom Moroney & Brian K. Sullivan, U.S. Cranberry Growers Give Thanks as Sales Rise in Europe,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 22, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/22/business
/worldbusiness/22iht-berry.3633021.html.
73 To be sure, if it turns out that cranberries have a large positive health effect such as curing cancer,
then they might be more widely consumed.
74 See Programs and Projects, UMASS DARTMOUTH CRANBERRY HEALTH RESEARCH CTR.,
http://www.umassd.edu/chrc/programsampprojects (last visited Jan 24, 2016).
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(so technically a public good); but with only the United States (and, to a lesser
extent, Canada) having a significant stake in the issue, cranberry-related R&D
does not pose a major international coordination challenge.75
Other examples are not hard to come by. Roughly three-quarters of the
world’s tornados occur in the United States, 76 so lack of international
coordination with respect to tornado-related R&D is probably not a significant
problem (even though tornado-related knowledge probably is nonrival and
nonexcludable). Moyamoya disease occurs primarily in the Japanese population—
Japan has over fifty times as many cases than the rest of the world combined77—so
it is unlikely that global coordination challenges will lead the Japanese government
to underinvest in Moyamoya-disease-related research. Indeed, knowledge goods
of this type (we will call them “cranberry goods”) might be the modal case. Most
patent applicants only seek to patent in a single jurisdiction; for example, patent
filing data suggests that about two-thirds of USPTO applications are only filed in
the United States.78 And even when the benefits of knowledge production are not
as limited geographically, there are some challenges that are so important to a
single country that the country’s government is likely to take on the challenge itself
rather than free-riding off the efforts of others (e.g., flood control in the
Netherlands79).
Certain creative works may resemble the “cranberry good” prototype to
an even greater degree. More than 96% of Swedish speakers live in Sweden, 80 so
one might expect the government of Sweden to have an incentive to invest close
to xglobal* in Swedish-language literature and lyrical music. (To be sure, some
Swedish-language books and songs may reach a much wider audience via
translation, as Stieg Larsson and ᗅᗺᗷᗅ can attest.) The United Kingdom may
have entirely adequate incentives to invest in the production of new recipes for

75 This does not mean that cranberries will have no economic effects outside the United States;
foreign firms may choose to invest in the U.S. agricultural industry, perhaps at the encouragement of
the U.S. government. Our point is simply that if demand for a knowledge good is geographically
concentrated in one country, then the good does not present the same problem of uncompensated
externalities discussed above.
76 See Kathryn Provic, From Domestic to International: Tornadoes Around the World, U.S. TORNADOES (July
25, 2013), http://www.ustornadoes.com/2013/07/25/from-domestic-to-international-tornadoesaround-the-world.
77 See Yoshiharu Matshushima, Moyamoya Disease, in PRINCIPLES
NEUROSURGERY 1053 (A. Leland Albright et al. eds., 1999).

AND

PRACTICE

OF

PEDIATRIC

78
See IP5 STATISTICS REPORT—2014 EDITION 49 tbl. 3 (2015), available at
http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2014edition/ip5sr2014.pdf (reporting that
roughly 66% of U.S. applicants with a 2010 priority filing year did not file elsewhere, compared with
57% for the European Patent Office, 72% for Japan, 96% for China, 83% for applicants in South
Korea, and 77% for applicants elsewhere). These figures might be explained in large part by the high
cost of foreign filing and enforcement rather than the geographic concentration of demand. See
MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 35 (2012)
(explaining why “obtaining parallel patents is difficult and costly” and only feasible for large companies).
79 See Andrew Higgins, Lessons for U.S. from a Flood-Prone Land, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/europe/netherlands-sets-model-of-floodprevention.html (discussing Dutch preeminence in flood-related research).
80 See Swedish, ETHNOLOGUE, http://www.ethnologue.com/language/swe (last visited Jan 24, 2016).
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steak and kidney pie81 (though perhaps the case for global coordination is stronger
with respect to the production of crime dramas starring Benedict Cumberbatch).
And for some creative works, the public goods framework is almost entirely
inapplicable because the relevant knowledge is inextricably tied to a rival and
excludable good. (No two individuals can have the same original Jeff Koons
balloon dog sculpture in their living room—unless they share a living room.82)
Global coordination is more essential with respect to knowledge goods for
which demand is widely dispersed—think of information about earthquake
dynamics or wind energy. In terms of rivalry and excludability, knowledge in
these fields may be no different from knowledge about the treatment of
Moyamoya disease and the tracking of tornados. But free-riding incentives are
much stronger. The United States knows that it can rely on the results of
earthquake-related research from Japan and wind-energy research from
Germany. And Japan and Germany face a similar incentive structure. Moreover,
even without opportunistic free-riding, the problem of uncompensated
externalities remains. The United States will rationally invest in knowledge
production up to the point that the marginal benefits (to the U.S.) equal the
marginal costs, but the marginal benefits to the United States of wind energyrelated knowledge represent only a fraction of the marginal global benefits;
accordingly, the United States will set its investment level below the point at
which marginal global benefits equal costs (and other countries will do the
same).83
Based on a rational-actor model of state behavior, then, aggregate global
investment in R&D will be closer to the socially optimal level with respect to
knowledge goods for which demand is concentrated in one or a small number of
industrialized nations. (When the demand for goods is localized only to developing
countries that cannot afford to produce the goods, local knowledge goods may
prove more difficult to finance than global knowledge goods.84) If the benefits of a
knowledge good are localized, the government of a single country (or a small set of
countries) will likely have an incentive to invest in R&D at or near the socially
optimal level. If demand is dispersed, the marginal benefit of R&D investment for
any one country is only a fraction of the marginal global benefit, and the freerider problem is more severe.

81
See,
e.g.,
Anthony
Worall
Thompson,
Steak
and
Kidney
Pie,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/food/recipes/steakandkidneypie_73308 (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).

BBC,

82 See Katya Kazakina and Philip Boroff, Koons’s Puppy Sets $58 Million Record for Living Artist,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS, Nov. 12, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-13/koonss-puppy-sets-58-million-record-for-living-artist.
83 It is important to distinguish between knowledge goods that are primarily enjoyed in a single
country (e.g., cranberry-related research) and the “local public goods” of Tieboutian theory. See Charles
M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Residents of other nations
are in no way excluded (by law or by distance) from enjoying the benefits of local knowledge goods.
What makes a knowledge good “local” is that demand is geographically concentrated.
84 See TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 89 (2004). For example, R&D on neglected
diseases that primarily affect populations with low purchasing power is less likely to be funded than
R&D on diseases that also affect the wealthiest countries, even when the neglected diseases have a
higher human cost.
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2. Local Production Externalities
Even where demand for information is dispersed, the problem of
producing global knowledge goods may be mitigated by the presence of positive
local production externalities. Local production externalities arise when a nearby
third party is affected (positively or negatively) by the production of a good or
service and when the third party neither charges nor pays the producer
commensurately. For example, a slaughterhouse might impose a negative
production externality on its neighbors, while a bakery might impose a positive
local production externality (the smell of fresh bread85).
Knowledge generation may result in positive local production externalities
as well.86 California’s Silicon Valley serves as an illustration. Early firms in the
area attracted workers with skills relevant to the semiconductor industry,
providing a pool of potential employees with industry-specific knowledge for
future ventures.87 The early firms also attracted investors to Silicon Valley, leading
to the growth of the venture capital sector.88 These factors meant that by the late
1960s, the cost of producing semiconductor-related knowledge goods was lower in
Silicon Valley than elsewhere. Thus, the cost to Intel of developing a four-bit
central processing unit circa 1971 was likely lower in northern California than it
would have been in, say, North Dakota: Intel had access to skilled workers who
had acquired industry-specific knowledge at other firms, as well as access to
potential sources of capital. In this way, efforts by the early firms in Silicon Valley
(e.g., Hewlett-Packard and Fairchild Semiconductor) yielded positive local
production externalities from which subsequent entrants (e.g., Intel and Apple)
benefitted.89
Putting this into the public-goods framework, one might say that
semiconductor-related research in Silicon Valley in the 1960s yielded benefits
with different degrees of globalness. The microprocessor is certainly not a
cranberry-type good: demand is widely dispersed. 90 On the other hand, the
positive production externalities of semiconductor-related research were
85 See, e.g., Nicolas Guéguen, The Sweet Smell of . . . Implicit Helping: Effects of Pleasant Ambient Fragrance on
Spontaneous Help in Shopping Malls, 152 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 397 (2012).
86 For an argument that sub-national governments can internalize many of the benefits of their
public spending on innovation, see Camilla Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2670400.
87 See David P. Angel, High-Technology Agglomeration and the Labor Market: The Case of Silicon Valley, in
UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 124 (Martin
Kenney ed., 2000).
88 See Martin Kenney & Richard Florida, Venture Capital in Silicon Valley: Fueling New Firm Formation, in
UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 87, at 98.
89 On positive local production externalities, see generally Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and
Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483 (1991).
90 This was not always the case. In the 1970s, Tim Berners-Lee tried to sell circuit boards with early
microprocessors in Oxford (before later going on to invent the World Wide Web), but he was not as
successful as Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak were with a similar endeavor in Silicon Valley partly
because Oxford did not have the demand supplied by Silicon Valley computer hobbyist groups.
WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS 407 (2014). Other knowledge goods may similarly shift from
cranberry-type goods to more global public goods over time.
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geographically concentrated: firms in Silicon Valley could benefit from improved
access to skilled labor, knowhow, and capital in ways that firms in Switzerland
could not. In other words, Silicon Valley firms had geographically sticky
complementary assets that made investments in knowledge about, say, new
semiconductor architectures far more valuable in that geographically
concentrated region than outside it, regardless of whether the knowledge was free
for other regions to copy.
The story of Silicon Valley is (largely91) a story of positive local production
externalities generated by private activity, but public R&D spending can likewise
lead to positive local production externalities.92 Consider the case of Huntsville,
Alabama, home to NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center since 1960. The NASA
center has attracted thousands of physicists, engineers, and other highly skilled
workers to Huntsville; by one measure, Huntsville ranks second in the nation in
the number of high-tech workers per capita (behind only Silicon Valley).93 Several
former NASA employees have gone on to found startups of their own; these new
ventures benefit from access to Huntsville’s highly skilled labor pool and close
connections with basic researchers at NASA. 94 Larger companies that value
proximity to U.S. military and NASA facilities (including Boeing, Northrop
Grumman, and Lockheed Martin) have established substantial presences in the
Huntsville area as well.95 Some of the knowledge generated by research at the
Marshall Space Flight Center meets the definition of a global public good: the
Hubble Space Telescope is perhaps the most prominent example of a project
pursued at Marshall that has yielded benefits for researchers worldwide. At the
same time, many of the economic benefits of R&D spending at Marshall are
concentrated in the surrounding area.96
Some argue that the incentive to attract mobile capital may lead
jurisdictions to invest in knowledge goods at levels above the social optimum. For
91 While most accounts of Silicon Valley’s success have focused on individual entrepreneurs, public
funds also played a key role. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT
SUPPORT FOR COMPUTING RESEARCH (1999); Stuart W. Leslie, The Biggest “Angel” of Them All: The
Military and the Making of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 87, at 48.
92 See, e.g., Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, The Emergence of Israel’s Venture Capital Industry: How Policy
Can Influence High-Tech Cluster Dynamics, in CLUSTER GENESIS: TECHNOLOGY-BASED INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT 172 (Pontus Bravnerhjelm & Maryann Feldman eds., 2006); Martha Prevezer & Han
Tang, Policy-Induced Clusters: The Genesis of Biotechnology Clustering on the East Coast of China, in CLUSTER
GENESIS, supra, at 113.
93 See TECHAMERICA FOUNDATION, CYBERCITIES 2010: THE DEFINITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE HIGHTECH INDUSTRY IN THE NATION’S TOP 60 CITIES (2010).
94 See, e.g., NASA, NASA’S IMPACT IN ALABAMA: A TECH TRANSFER PERSPECTIVE (2012), available
at https://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/economic-impacts/Alabama_NASA-Economic-Impacts.pdf.
95 See Leading Employers Huntsville/Madison County, HUNTSVILLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.huntsvillealabamausa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=194&Itemi
d=355 (last updated Aug. 2015).
96 Similarly, public investments in technology infrastructure—such as the U.S. broadband sales tax
exemption or direct funding of the U.S. National Nanotechnology Infrastructure Network—provide
benefits to local industry that are difficult for other jurisdictions to appropriate. See Hemel & Ouellette,
supra note 3, at 332 & n.140; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Nanotechnology and Innovation Policy, 29 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 33, 69 (2015).These kinds of infrastructure investments lower the costs of knowledge
production for firms located close enough to use them, which draws technology producers to the area.
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instance, Israel may lure Intel to set up a new facility south of Tel Aviv by offering
tax incentives,97 but little is gained from a global welfare perspective if the new
facility in Israel simply replaces one in California. Indeed, studies of U.S. states
provide some evidence of a “beggar-thy-neighbor” effect from state tax incentives
for R&D. 98 Theoretical work similarly suggests that international competition
may lead to supraoptimal subsidies for R&D under certain circumstances.99
We are agnostic as to whether this story of overinvestment due to local
production externalities is a plausible one. To see why it might not be, consider
again the example of bakeries that generate a positive local production
externality—the smell of fresh bread. We can imagine residents banding together
to subsidize bakeries in their neighborhood, and we can imagine bakeries moving
from one neighborhood to another in order to capture such subsidies. But would
this lead to too much production of bread? It is not obvious why subsidies would
lead to overproduction. No resident group would have an incentive to offer a
subsidy larger than the local production externality (i.e., the benefit that the
bakery brings to the neighborhood). Resident groups that place a higher value on
the smell of bread might bid to lure bakeries to their neighborhoods, but this
would likely lead to an even more efficient geographic distribution of bakeries—
with bread being baked in the areas that appreciate it most.
To be sure, one can construct a model in which subsidies are
supraoptimal. Let’s say that the supply of bread is inelastic; thus, the subsidy from
residents to bakeries is a pure transfer, with no effect on output. But if the subsidy
is financed through a mechanism (such as a tax) that itself yields deadweight loss,
then the subsidy is in that sense supraoptimal: something is lost and nothing is
gained. Why, though, would we expect the supply of bread (or of knowledge
goods) to be inelastic? And even if supply is inelastic, subsidies may have
efficiency-enhancing effects: they may spur bakeries (or analogously, knowledge
producers) to relocate to the areas in which the local production externalities from
their activities are highest.
Our argument, then, is not a claim about overinvestment. Rather, our
argument is that in a price-taking (non-strategic 100) model, rational and selfinterested states will invest in knowledge production up to the point that the
marginal benefits from a national-welfare perspective equal the marginal costs,
and that the left side of the equation includes both the benefits that citizens of the
state derive from the consumption of knowledge goods as well as positive local
production externalities. The larger these terms are relative to the marginal global
benefits, the less underinvestment we should expect to see. In sum, when
knowledge goods are more local than global—i.e., when consumption is
97 See, e.g., David Shamah, How Intel Came To Be Israel’s Best Tech Friend, TIMES OF ISRAEL, Apr. 23,
2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/how-intel-came-to-be-israels-best-tech-friend.

See, e.g., Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State, and Aggregate Effects of R&D
Tax Credits, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 431 (2009).
98

99 See Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy, 50
REV. ECON. STUD. 707 (1983).
100 Strategic interactions complicated this model: states may try to commit to underinvestment so as
to induce other states to invest more. See infra notes 215–219 and accompanying text.
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concentrated geographically and production generates positive externalities that
depreciate across space—then the underinvestment problem described above is
less of a problem.
3. An Extension of the Formal Economic Model
To illustrate how this richer understanding of knowledge goods affects the
underinvestiment hypothesis, we continue with the rudimentary formal model
begun in Part I. As before, x is the level of investment in the production of a
particular knowledge good; BA(x) is the benefit to consumers in SA from investment
of x in the relevant good; Bglobal is the sum of all Bs for all nation-states; and C(x) is
the cost of investing x. Also, as before, the globally optimal level of investment is
xglobal*; and xA* < xglobal* when BA(x) < Bglobal(x).
The presence of positive local production externalities further complicates
this story. Let PE(x) represent the production externality from x level of
investment. Assume that the production externality is captured entirely by the
country that makes the investment. For instance, diabetes research might benefit
all diabetes patients, but diabetes research in Israel might confer an additional
advantage on Israeli biotech firms who benefit from access to the talent pool of
diabetes researchers attracted to Israel as a result of the investment. Once positive
local production externalities enter the picture, the solution to SA’s optimization
problem changes. Now, SA sets xA* such that BA'(x) + PE'(x) = C'(x). As long as
PE'(x) > 0, the addition of this term pushes xA* upward.
This formalization allows us to make more precise claims about
underinvestment. First, underinvestment becomes less severe as BA(x)/Bglobal(x)
approaches 1, meaning that knowledge good is closer to a local public good than a
global one. (When BA(x)/Bglobal(x) = 1, the good is a pure cranberry good and the
underinvestment problem goes away.) Second, underinvestment becomes less
severe when PE'(x) is large relative to other terms in SA’s calculus. Another way to
say this is that presence of positive local production externalities makes investment
in the provision of knowledge goods more attractive from a national perspective.
The underinvestment hypothesis appears most plausible when knowledge goods
are global public goods and states are rational actors seeking to maximize absolute
gains. As we discuss below, however, the underinvestment hypothesis does not get
us the whole way to a justification for the international IP regime, because IP is
not the only way for consumer nation-states to compensate producer states. We
pick up the question of institutional design in Part IV and discuss alternative
institutional structures that might support cooperative outcomes. Before that,
though, we interrogate the assumption that states are rational actors whose motive
is to maximize the welfare of their own citizens.
B. What Motivates Nation-States?
Our predictions so far have been based on the assumption that states are
rational actors that seek to maximize the absolute welfare of their citizens. In the
international relations literature, this assumption is associated with the theory of
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institutionalism (also known as “regime theory”).101 According to institutionalism,
states are “rational egoists” that (at least sometimes) see each other as potential
partners in mutually beneficial cooperative endeavors. 102 Institutions such as
international agreements and organizations play a key role in this story.103 For
institutionalists, the challenge of global public good production is largely a
problem of institutional design, and arrangements with incentive-compatible
features can yield cooperative outcomes.104
The institutionalist perspective thus maps nicely onto the economic
account presented thus far of IP treaties as solving the uncompensatedexternalities underinvestment problem. But the international political economy
literature has presented other accounts of how nation-states are motivated. In this
Section, we examine three leading alternative accounts—grounded in national
security concerns, international norms, and domestic politics—and their
implications for investment in knowledge goods.
1. National Security
Until recently, the “dominant theory” of international relations was not
institutionalism—it was realism,105 which “paints a rather grim picture of world
politics.” 106 Like institutionalists, realists assume that nation-states are rational
actors, but realists believe that states are focused on relative rather than absolute
gains.107 This is because states “are potentially dangerous to each other,” are
unsure of each other’s intentions, and want—more than anything else—to
maintain their own sovereignty.108
Based on these assumptions, realists predict that states will “aim to
maximize their relative power position over other states”—or, at the very least, to

101 See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 494 tbl.1 (1988); Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes
in an Anarchic World, 36 INT’L ORG. 299, 318 (1982) (noting that regime theory sees states as “actors
[who] focus on their own returns and compare different outcomes with an eye to maximizing their own
gains,” as distinguished from the “alternative conception” of states as “actors [who] seek to maximize
the difference between their own returns and those of others”).
102 Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L SECURITY 39,
39 (1995).

See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION
POLITICAL ECONOMY 244 (1984).
103

AND

DISCORD

IN THE

WORLD

104 See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 766–68 (2001).
105 See MICHAEL DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE 41 (1997); see also Thomas C. Walker & Jeffrey
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341 (2005) (documenting decline in proportion of articles in international relations journals adopting a
realist perspective).
106 John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SECURITY 5, 9 (1994).
107 Id. at 10.
108 Id. More precisely, realists break these beliefs into five assumptions about the international
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and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 488
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“maintain[] the existing balance of power.”109 In measuring “power,” realists look
not only to a state’s military strength, but also to its supply of scientific and
technological talent. 110 Thus, realists predict that states will invest in science
education and research in order to maintain power parity with (or gain a relative
advantage over) potential rivals.111
The “Space Race” between the United States and Soviet Union in the
second half of the twentieth century is—at least arguably112—an illustration of
realist predictions proving to be correct. The successful launch of the first artificial
satellite, Sputnik, by the Soviet Union in 1957 (combined with the initial failures
of the United States’ Vanguard satellite program) 113 shattered the American
public’s post-World War II sense of security.114 The same rockets that put a
satellite in orbit could, hypothetically, carry a nuclear warhead onto American
soil. Perhaps more frighteningly, Sputnik seemed to be the tangible confirmation
of reports from the mid-1950s that the Soviet Union was producing two to three
times the number of scientists and engineers as the United States.115 The national
security implications of this technological gap prompted the United States to
quickly make scientific education and space-related technologies into national
priorities. Within two years of Sputnik’s launch, Congress increased funding for
the National Science Foundation from $40 million to $140 million,116 created
NASA to coordinate and fund the space program,117 and launched the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (now DARPA) within the Department of Defense.118
After years of reluctance to provide federal assistance to education, Congress
Mearsheimer, supra note 106, at 11 & n.27; see also Grieco, supra note 108, at 498 (“[R]ealists find
that . . . the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative
capabilities.” (emphasis in original)).
110 See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, FRANCE IN THE AGE OF THE SCIENTIFIC STATE 15 (1968) (“[S]cientific
research has become a primary determinant of national power . . . .”); JOHN J. MEARSHEINER, THE
TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 56 (2001) (noting that scientific achievements are an indicator of
“latent capabilities” that a state can convert into military power).
109

111 See, e.g., GILPIN, supra note 110, at 15 (“[T]he three goals of French foreign policy [in the
1960s]—the continued military deterrence of the Soviet Union, the economic and political containment
of the United States, and the establishment of French primacy in western Europe—are greatly
dependent on the state of French science and technology. For this reason . . . the advancement of
scientific research has become a dominant concern of the leadership of contemporary France.”); Harvey
M. Sapolsky, Science, Technology and Military Policy, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY: A CROSSDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 443, 445 (Ina Spiegel-Rösing et al. eds., 1977) (“Governments have long
acted as patrons of science in the hope of gaining improvements in the instruments and techniques of
war; what is new in our time is the scale of the patronage offered and the impact which science has had
on warfare.”).
112 But see Rodger A. Payne, Public Opinion and Foreign Threats: Eisenhower’s Response to Sputnik, 21
ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 89 (1994) (questioning the realist account).
113
See
Roger
Launius,
Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age,
NASA,
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html (last visited Jan 24, 2016).
114 See PAUL DICKSON, SPUTNIK: THE SHOCK OF THE CENTURY 4 (2001).
115 See David Kaiser, The Physics of Spin: Sputnik Politics and American Physicists in the 1950s, 73 SOC.
RESEARCH 1225, 1227 (2006).
116 National Science Foundation Budget, 127 SCIENCE 510 (1958).
117 See Launius, supra note 113.
118 See Duncan Graham-Rowe, Fifty Years of DARPA: A Surprising History, NEW SCIENTIST (May 15,
2008), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13908-fifty-years-of-darpa-a-surprising-history.
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passed the National Defense Education Act in 1958 to increase the number of
students in science at advanced levels.119 Maintaining an edge in scientific talent
began to be seen as essential to the long-term security of the United States.120 And
those national security concerns catalyzed public spending on R&D, setting the
stage for countless future scientific advances (not the least of which was
“ARPANET,” the technological foundation of today’s Internet).121
The realist perspective on public R&D spending starkly contrasts with the
free-rider narrative. If the free-rider account is correct, then we would expect
Country A’s spending on R&D to decrease as Country B’s R&D spending increases
(i.e., Country A would stand aside as Country B plows ahead). The realist
perspective yields quite a different prediction: insofar as Country A and Country
B are potential military rivals, Country A’s spending on R&D will increase with
Country B’s. Rather than free-riding off Country A’s expenditures, Country B will
bolster its R&D efforts in an attempt to keep pace. Moreover, while the free-rider
narrative predicts that aggregate public spending on R&D will fall below the
global social optimum, realism suggests the possibility of the opposite result. One
country’s efforts to boost its own scientific and technological capabilities—and
thus its security—may decrease the security of others.122 In this way, a lack of
coordination among countries with respect to R&D spending may result in each
country investing more than the socially optimal amount in certain areas of science
and technology.
One might question whether the realist account has any explanatory
power beyond the limited domain of defense and defense-related technology.
Moreover, while the realist account might suggest the possibility of overinvestment
(at least in some areas), it might also lead us to expect to see “undersharing” (i.e.,
states focused on relative gains will keep their scientific and technological
advances a secret from potential rivals).123 In practice, though, even research for

119 See BARBARA CLOWSE, BRAINPOWER FOR THE COLD WAR: THE SPUTNIK CRISIS
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF EDUCATION ACT OF 1958, at 4 (1981).
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120 See Donald Quarles, Cultivating Our Science Talent—Key to Long-Term Security, 80 SCI. MONTHLY 352
(1955); see also ISAACSON, supra note 90, at 72 (“War mobilizes science. . . . and this was especially true in
the mid-twentieth century. Many of the paramount technological feats of that era—computers, atomic
power, radar, and the Internet—were spawned by the military.”).
121 See Sharon Weinberger, Defence Research: Still in the Lead?, 451 NATURE 390 (2008). The expressed
desire to maintain comparative technological superiority over did not die with the fall of the Soviet
Union. For example, news that China is poised to surpass the United States in R&D spending by 2022
was greeted not with joy that there will be more knowledge production for us to free-ride on, but with
concern about the need to preserve “American superiority.” Jacqueline Klimas, Lawmakers Worry China
Will
Top
U.S.
in
Scientific
Research,
WASH.
TIMES.
(Mar.
27,
2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/27/lawmakers-worry-china-will-top-us-scientificresea. One congressman was quoted as saying, “I wish we could be investing even more, especially as
other nations are rising to challenge our pre-eminence.” Id. (quoting Representative Adam B. Schiff).
122 See generally Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167 (1978).
123 U.S. patents are sometimes kept secret when the government determines that publication would
be a national security threat. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2012); G.W. Schulz, Government Secrecy Orders on Patents
Have Stifled More Than 5,000 Inventions, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/04/govsecrecy-orders-on-patents.
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which the primary results are not shared can lead to significant spillovers.124
Furthermore, we observe defense research agencies investigating a wide array of
topics and publicizing their results—on subjects ranging from concussion
prevention125 to climate change126 to the treatment of infectious diseases.127 To be
sure, some of this research may be driven by motives unrelated to national
security; the fact that it is carried out by a defense research agency could be
bureaucratic happenstance. However, we think that a realist approach might offer
some relevant insights.
For some scholars in the realist tradition, the perception of power is as
important as power itself. 128 Capabilities are useful to states in international
politics not only because they can be deployed in wartime, but because they can
be used to deter or influence other states in peacetime. A state that amasses
scientific and technological capabilities may want to send signals to other states
clueing them into that fact. Yet for reasons that are obvious, the United States
might not want to invite a cadre of Russian Air Force generals to inspect its latest
fighter jet. Instead, the United States wants Russia to know that the United States
has the capability to develop cutting-edge weaponry but does not want to share
too many details of its technology with a potential rival.
One way to accomplish this objective is for the United States to publicize
the results of research showing that its scientists are top-rate; ideally, the research
would be relevant enough to defense applications that it would lead Russia to raise
its estimate of U.S. military capabilities—but not so closely related to defense
applications that publicizing the results would amount to giving away the store.
The research need not be conducted by the U.S. military itself as long as the
results lead Russia to elevate its estimate of the quality of scientists that the U.S.
military might potentially have at its disposal. Of course, if the research product
also yields benefits for U.S. consumers, then all the better. But the selection of
research projects for signaling purposes does not necessarily follow the marginal
benefit/marginal cost calculus discussed above.
We cannot say how much government-sponsored research is explained by
our signaling story; we offer the signaling theory simply as a reason why securityfocused states might invest in science and technology. The signaling account is
For example, the space race led to developments ranging from satellite television to carbon
monoxide detectors. See Rob Mead, 10 Tech Breakthroughs to Thank the Space Race for, TECHRADAR (July
20, 2009), http://www.techradar.com/us/news/world-of-tech/10-tech-breakthroughs-to-thank-thespace-race-for-617847.
124

125 See Kris Osborn, NFL-Army Collaborative Research on Concussions Yields Initial Results, SCOUT (Nov.
20, 2015), http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1613090-army-nfl-test-high-tech-helmetsfor-safety.
126 See Kris Osborn, Navy Researchers Are Analyzing Findings from Drones Beneath Arctic Ice, SCOUT (Dec. 1,
2015), http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1618090-navy-drones-patrol-beneath-arctic-ice.
127 See
DEFENCE SCI. & TECH. LAB., LICENSING OPPORTUNITY: GAMMA-GLUTAMYL
TRANSPEPTIDASE
ATTENUATED
FRANCISELLA
(2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399418/Gammaglutamyl_transpeptidase_attenuated_Francisella_Easy_Access_IP_factsheet.pdf.
128 See William C. Wohlforth, The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance, 39 WORLD POL.
353 (1987).
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probably most plausible with respect to military powers (e.g., the United States
and Russia) that are keenly concerned about the way that other states perceive
their capabilities; it is a less plausible explanation for public R&D spending in, say,
Switzerland.129 For present purposes, our point is only that some nation-states
may finance the production of knowledge goods even in circumstances where the
conventional account might suggest that they would not: i.e., where the marginal
benefit to domestic consumers is less than the marginal cost.
2. Norms
A more recent rival to realism and institutionalism is “constructivism.”130
Unlike realists and institutionalists, who start from fixed assumptions about state
interests, constructivists seek to “open up . . . the black box of interest and identity
formation”; their central claim is that state interests emerge from their interactions
with other states and international institutions.131 The difference between realists
and institutionalists, on the one side, and constructivists, on the other, is
sometimes described as the difference between a “logic of consequences” and a
“logic of appropriateness”: whereas realists and institutionalists assume that states
act strategically in order to achieve their individual goals, constructivists argue
that interstate interactions help to determine what goals each state pursues.132
Phrased differently, constructivists believe that states, “through their social
interaction in accordance with the rules and processes of [the international]
system, learn from and confirm to each other what it means to be a state.”133 And as
states update their understanding of what the international system expects from
them, they conform their behavior to the prevailing logic of appropriateness.
All of this may sound highly abstract, but a concrete example may help to
illustrate. Martha Finnemore observes that through the mid-1960s, “poverty
alleviation” was not “an explicitly articulated and internationalized goal of states
and multilateral organizations”; rather, development efforts by states and
international organizations focused primarily on growth. 134 Finnemore further
129 Note, though, that Japan—whose constitution outlaws war as a means of settling interstate
disputes—may gain substantial security benefits from the perception that its scientists could, if pressed,
develop offensive nuclear capabilities very quickly. See Jeffrey Lewis, If Japan Wanted to Build a Nuclear
Bomb It’d Be Awesome at It, FOREIGN POLICY, June 26, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/26/ifjapan-wanted-to-build-a-nuclear-bomb-itd-be-awesome-at-it.
130 See Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 WORLD POL. 324
(1998); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social
Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998).
131 Checkel, supra note 130, at 325.
132 See, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,
52 INT’L ORG. 943, 949 (1998); see also Jack Goldsmith, Book Review, Sovereignty, International Relations
Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 965 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999)) (“[Constructivists] argue that international norms help
constitute the identity of actors on the international stage (such as nations and rulers) and help shape
their interests. In this way, national behaviors are significantly influenced by international norms in
ways that do not reduce to an instrumental calculus.”).
133 David Armstrong, Globalization and the Social State, 24 REV. INT’L STUD. 461, 468 (1998) (emphasis
added).
134 MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 97 (1996).
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argues that the World Bank, under the leadership of Robert McNamara, played a
pivotal role in convincing states in the late 1960s and 1970s to redirect their
development efforts from the goal of growth to the goal of poverty alleviation.
That is, McNamara and the World Bank triggered a “normative shift” resulting in
a widespread belief that poverty alleviation was something “that states were
supposed to do.”135 McNamara and the World Bank succeeded in altering the
logic of appropriateness, such that states now believe that the international
community expects them to make poverty reduction a policy priority.
Constructivist scholars have pointed to other “normative shifts”—on matters
ranging from slavery to the killing of whales and elephants—that appear to be the
result of similar dynamics.136
Just as realism directs our attention to security concerns and
institutionalism directs our attention to the design features of international
organizations and agreements, constructivism directs our attention to the norms
that guide state behavior. On the constructivist view, states will invest in
knowledge production if they come to perceive science as something states are supposed
to do. Similarly, a state’s choice between IP and non-IP mechanisms will depend
not only on the perceived costs and benefits of those tools, but also on the
perceived appropriateness of each approach.
Constructivism helps to explain the widespread creation of science policy
organizations by developing countries in the third quarter of the twentieth
century. Starting in the 1950s, officials of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) began to encourage member
states to set up their own science bureaucracies and to invest in R&D
domestically. A UN report at the dawn of the next decade declared that “[s]tates
should make it their business” to promote scientific research within their own
borders.137 In 1966, a UNESCO statement of principles proclaimed that “[t]he
development of science policy should be the responsibility of an organization at
the highest level of government” in each country.138 These and similar statements
reflected an emerging international norm: scientific research, according to
UNESCO officials, was something states ought to do, even if a rational-choice
calculus would suggest that free-riding was the optimal strategy.
Martha Finnemore has shown how an emerging logic of appropriateness
led small developing countries—including Lebanon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan,
Tanzania, and Zambia—to establish national science organizations by the end of
the 1960s, with a view to promoting domestic R&D.139 These efforts are difficult
to explain from the perspective of rational institutionalism: as Finnemore notes,
135

Id. at 90.
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these nations may have been materially better off if they had followed a free-riding
strategy.140 And realism is no more helpful: there is no apparent reason to believe
that developing countries achieved any security benefits as a result of their R&D
investments. Finnemore’s case studies suggest that at least some public R&D
spending is best understood as a reflection of prevailing international norms, not
as a consequence of economic or security considerations.
This norms-based account might be reframed as a “prestige”-based
account: investments in the production of knowledge goods (and, in particular,
investments that yield successful results) raise a nation-state’s standing in the
international community. The pursuit of prestige—like the quest for security in
the realist account—may be a zero-sum game: if prestige is relative, then one
nation-state’s investment in increasing its own prestige may decrease the utility of
other states.141 Alternatively, prestige may serve as a substitute for cash transfers
from consumer nation-states to producer nation-states: if the U.S. National
Institutes for Health develops a successful Ebola vaccine and gives it away to
patients in West African countries at zero cost, the United States may be partially
compensated for its efforts through prestige gains.142 A full-fledged prestige-based
account would require a more careful specification of the particular benefits that
prestige brings as well as the reasons why nation-states pursue those benefits.
While we do not develop such an account here, we note the possibility that
elements of the constructivist account may be translatable into a rational-actor
model in which TBàA (the transfer from the consumer state to the producer state)
takes a nonmonetary form.
To be sure, nothing in constructivist theory suggests that international
norms will always lead countries to invest more in R&D. Norms can push nations
in the opposite direction—for example, leading states not to invest in research
related to genetically modified organisms.143 The key point is that constructivist
theory, like realism, may aid in explaining why patterns of public R&D spending
diverge from the free-rider account’s predictions. Constructivism cannot,
however, tell us the direction or magnitude of that divergence in all cases.
3. Domestic Politics
A fourth perspective, known in the international relations literature as
“liberalism” or “liberal intergovernmentalism,” shares key features of the other
three approaches but focuses attention on actors “below the state.”144 Like realism
140
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and institutionalism, liberalism sees behavior on the international stage as the
product of instrumentally rational action. And like constructivism, liberalism
opens up the “black box” of state interests. The foundational assumption of liberal
international relations theory is that “[t]he fundamental actors in international
politics are individuals and private groups, who are on average rational” and who
use state institutions to pursue their goals.145 On this view, state action reflects the
preferences of a subset of domestic society that has prevailed in political
competition. 146 Liberals do not deny that the balance of power and the
configuration of international institutions affect outcomes, but they posit that these
variables have only a secondary influence. Liberals argue that “what states want is
the primary determinant of what they do”—and “what states want” is primarily a
function of who has won out in domestic political competition.147
The liberal perspective thus focuses our attention on interest groups at the
domestic level who compete to influence national policy. Liberalism predicts that
states will invest in science if—and only if—the beneficiaries of such investment
have sufficient pull among policymakers domestically. Similarly, the selection of
IP vs. non-IP tools will reflect interest-group politics. That is, state investment in
knowledge production may have little to do with relative power (realism), or with
absolute gains (institutionalism), or with prevailing norms (constructivism), but will
have much to do with the prevailing political alignment inside the state.
An optimistic version of the liberal account might posit that, at least in
democratic countries, leaders will be responsive to public opinion and that the
public generally supports domestic R&D spending. In the United States, for
instance, a Pew survey in 2013 found that even when faced with a possible budget
sequester, 77% of the public wanted to maintain or increase research funding,
while only 20% favored cuts.148 A poll the following year found that 71% of U.S.
adults believed that government investment in basic scientific research would “pay
off in the long run.”149 Surveys in the United Kingdom and Japan find similar
support for government spending on scientific research. 150 Perhaps these poll
numbers reflect the fact that voters are conducting their own cost-benefit calculus
and concluding that investment in R&D is a welfare-improving use of public
resources. But given how difficult it is for even the most highly skilled economist to
calculate the optimal level of public investment in R&D, a more plausible
145 Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG.
513, 516–521 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
146 Id. at 518 (emphasis omitted).
147 Id. at 521.
148 As Sequester Deadline Looms, Little Support for Cutting Most Programs, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 22,
2013),
http://www.people-press.org/2013/02/22/as-sequester-deadline-looms-little-support-forcutting-most-programs.
149 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICANS, POLITICS AND SCIENCE ISSUES 76 (2015), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/07/2015-07-01_science-and-politics_FINAL.pdf.
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2002),
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind02/c7/c7s2.htm (noting that agreement with the statement “Even if
it brings no immediate benefits, scientific research that advances the frontiers of knowledge is necessary
and should be supported by the Federal Government” has “consistently been in the 80-percent range”
in the United States, and was 72% in the United Kingdom in 2000 and 80% in Japan in 1995).
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conclusion is that most voters support science spending based on a rough guess
that benefits exceed costs rather than a rigorous cost-benefit evaluation.
A more pessimistic version of the liberal account, influenced by public
choice theory rather than a faith in democratic processes, might lead us to
consider whether some share of public R&D spending reflects rent-seeking
activities by beneficiaries of such expenditures. Indeed, the same public-goods
logic underlying the free-rider narrative suggests that well-organized interest
groups will successfully extract wealth transfers from the state. Protection of the
public fisc is itself a public good, as all taxpayers stand to benefit from the prudent
allocation of government resources. In the political struggle between concentrated
subsidy-seeking industry groups on the one hand and diffuse taxpayers on the
other, we anticipate that free-riding behavior will be more rampant on the latter
side, tilting the competitive balance in favor of the former. 151 At least some
amount of public support for R&D may be attributed to this imbalance.152
Not all rents will take the form of direct subsidies to interest groups. For
example, IP protection may serve as an indirect way of transferring rents to
producers of knowledge goods—with the aforementioned advantage that IP does
not require politicians to raise taxes.153 Many accounts of the political economy of
copyright lawmaking seem to fit within this more pessimistic vision of liberalism,
with industry rent-seekers leading to over-protection,154 raising questions about
the validity of the underinvestment hypothesis for many creative works.
Rent extraction through R&D support also may be a way of skirting
international trade law limits on production subsidies.155 For instance, instead of
an outright subsidy to aircraft manufacturers (which might trigger WTO
sanctions 156 ), the U.S. federal government might sponsor research on jet
propulsion with potential applications for U.S. companies. To be sure, the indirect
subsidy might not have its intended effect if foreign aircraft manufacturers can
make use of the research findings just as easily as U.S. manufacturers can. Yet if
U.S. firms—due to their proximity to the scientists carrying on the research—are

151
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better able to operationalize the results, then government support for the project
might function much like a production subsidy while differing in name.157
As with constructivism, the liberal perspective does not necessarily lead us
to reject the underinvestment hypothesis. Just as beneficiaries of public support for
R&D may lobby intensively for increasing expenditures, other constituencies (e.g.,
deficit hawks and tax-cut advocates) may push politicians in the opposite
direction. But the liberal perspective does suggest that the process of determining
domestic R&D spending levels is more complicated than the standard stories of
free-riding and uncompensated externalities suggest. Even where free-riding
would appear to be the optimal strategy from a national welfare perspective,
corporate and other interest groups may prevail on politicians to devote additional
resources to domestic R&D. By the same token, even where the internalized
benefits of R&D investment would appear to exceed the budgetary costs, domestic
politics may stand in the way of spending hikes.
What does all this mean for the conventional economic account of
international coordination as a solution to the underinvestment problem? The
short answer is that we cannot be certain: the underinvestment hypothesis is
empirically unverifiable but intuitively plausible, at least with respect to knowledge
goods of the global-public-good variety. While we expect that nation-states will be
influenced by a variety of factors not captured in our rudimentary economic
model, we have no strong reason to believe that these other factors will
systematically favor underinvestment or overinvestment. Another way to say this
is that for knowledge goods of the global-public-good type, the underinvestment
hypothesis may yield an accurate but noisy estimate of state behavior: while we
expect that behavior will diverge from the hypothesis’s predictions in countless
cases, we have no strong reason to expect systematic divergence in one direction
or the other.

III. Domestic Diversity Under International IP Law
Under the “harmonization hypothesis” presented in Part I, agreements
such as TRIPS dictate how nation-states subsidize and allocate knowledge goods
at the domestic level, leading to “too much” IP and “too little” support for non-IP
mechanisms. As we explain here, however, the existence of a global IP regime
does not require any individual nation-state to rely on IP as a mechanism for
incentivizing innovation or allocating access to knowledge goods at the domestic
level. At first glance, this claim may seem surprising. After all, if a country signs a
global IP treaty such as TRIPS, doesn’t that obligate the country to provide
protection for IP domestically? To a limited extent, the answer is yes: a TRIPS
signatory must establish copyright and patent systems that meet minimum
standards and treat citizens of other signatories at least as favorably as its own
citizens. Yet, as we explain in the following two sections, TRIPS still leaves
Why might U.S. firms have an advantage in operationalizing the results? Presumably the results
would be published in English, and the scientists might be willing to meet with counterparts from U.S.
firms. Moreover, U.S. firms might be able to hire the scientists themselves after the project is complete,
making the transfer of knowledge from government to domestic industry even more seamless.
157
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individual nations substantial leeway to adopt alternative arrangements for both
the provision and allocation of knowledge goods within their own borders.
A. The Separability of International and Domestic Incentives
International IP treaties require nation-states to offer minimum levels of IP
protection for knowledge production, which ensures that foreign consumers bear
some of the cost of domestic innovation through the higher prices they pay on IPprotected goods. This appears to create an asymmetry between IP and non-IP
incentives, in that foreign consumers need not contribute to non-IP subsidies for
knowledge production, even when they reap substantial benefits. But the existence
of international IP treaties means that nation-states can in fact seek compensation
from foreign consumers. That is, the international IP system allows states to
internalize some of the benefits of knowledge produced through public finance
mechanisms.
Most directly, recipients of knowledge-production subsidies such as prizes,
grants, and tax credits could be required to assign all IP rights to the state, which
could enforce those rights abroad. Thus, the fact that a country has signed onto a
global IP treaty doesn’t mean that the country must use IP to incentivize
information production at the domestic level. Rather, a country that signs onto a
global IP treaty acquires the option to seek compensation from foreign users of
domestically produced knowledge goods, while retaining the freedom to choose
whatever innovation-incentive mechanism it pleases at the domestic level.158
This possibility is not purely hypothetical. U.S. federal agencies that
develop knowledge goods in-house often retain IP rights to their inventions and
then license those inventions internationally (as well as domestically).159 But a state
need not assert foreign IP rights itself to obtain compensation from abroad; it
could also allow the innovator to assert these rights and then collect a share of the
profits through taxation. The U.S. federal government offers a tax credit equal to
20% of research expenses above a “base amount” (the base amount is calculated
158 Commentators advocating opt-in medical prize schemes have noted that these systems are
clearly TRIPS compliant. See HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 59, at 106; WILLIAM W. FISHER III & TALHA
SYED, INFECTION: THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO
ABOUT IT (forthcoming) (manuscript ch. 5, at 37), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people
/tfisher/Infection_Prizes_3.0.pdf. Opt-in prize systems need not be implemented on a global scale: an
individual country can offer a prize for relinquishment of domestic IP rights while still enforcing IP
rights abroad.
159 In 2014, the National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Food
and Drug Administration brought in $137 million in patent royalties. See OTT Statistics, NIH—OFFICE
OF INTRAMURAL RESEARCH—OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, http://www.ott.nih.gov/ottstatistics (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). The Departments of Energy and Defense are active patenters as
well. See PAUL W. HEISEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ECON.
RESEARCH REPORT NO. 15, GOVERNMENT PATENTING AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 16 (2006),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/471043/err15_1_.pdf. The phenomenon is not limited to
the United States: the governments of France, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India have all
amassed patent portfolios (including, in some cases, acquiring patent rights from abroad). See Hosuk
Lee-Makiyama & Patrick Messerlin, Sovereign Patent Funds (SPFs): Next-Generation Trade Defence? (Eur. Ctr.
for
Int’l
Pol.
Econ.,
Policy
Brief
No.
6/2014,
2014),
available
at
http://ecipe.org/app/uploads/2014/12/PB06.pdf.
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on the basis of the taxpayer’s historical research expenditures),160 but the federal
government effectively reclaims a portion of the returns to R&D when it imposes
a tax on corporate and individual income.
Recipients of federal research grants in the United States are also able to
patent inventions resulting from that research under the Bayh-Dole Act and
license them for domestic manufacture (a regime that has been replicated in many
other countries).161 Then, when foreign consumers purchase goods and services
protected by that IP, the IP “shadow tax” is transferred back to the U.S.
patentee.162 One might ask whether the federal government is really “reclaiming”
any of the payment from foreign consumers if the payment flows to a tax-exempt
private research institution such as Stanford or the University of Chicago. In at
least one sense, the answer is “yes”: the tax exemption for private universities is a
“tax
expenditure”—economically
little
different
from
any
other
163
appropriation —so the federal government is effectively claiming a share of the
foreign benefits and then giving that share back to the patenting universities.
The observation can be extended a step further. International IP law does
not constrain the United States in taxing domestic producers of knowledge goods.
The United States could set a tax on patent royalties of zero or 100% or anywhere
in between.164 (To be sure, there are good reasons why the United States does not
set its tax rate at 100%.) In virtually every case, the flow of royalties from a foreign
consumer to a U.S. patentee can be redescribed as (1) a payment from the foreign
consumer to the U.S. government and (2) a decision by the U.S. government as to
what percentage of the royalties should flow through to the U.S. patentee. The
international IP regime sets a framework for setting the size of the payment at step
one but allows the producer state substantial autonomy at step two.165

26 U.S.C. § 41.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211; David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and
University–Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
EDWIN MANSFIELD 233, 241 (Albert N. Link & F.M. Scherer eds., 2005); Anthony D. So et al., Is BayhDole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 6 PLOS BIO. 2078 (2008). For examples of
domestic-industry provisions in the equivalent of Bayh-Dole in other countries, see Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Scientific and Technological Progress art. 21 (2007 Revision), available at
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=6591&lib=law; and South Africa Intellectual Property Rights
from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act art. 11 (2008), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/iprfpfrada2008736.
162 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
163 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF
TAX EXPENDITURES (1973).
164 Or above or below. Marginal tax rates can—in theory—exceed 100% (and sometimes in
practice too; see Taxes on Some Wealthy French Top 100 Pct of Income: Paper, REUTERS, May 18, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-tax-idUSBRE94H0AX20130518). And a subsidy is, in
effect, a subzero marginal tax rate.
160
161

165 In this respect, our analysis suggests a counterargument to Benjamin Roin’s claim that
intellectual property “limits [the government’s] ability to expropriate socially valuable innovations.”
Roin, supra note 9, at 1071. In Roin’s view, IP laws allow a state to make a credible commitment to
innovators that the state will allow them to reap the rewards from their own knowledge production
efforts. Yet nothing in IP law limits the tax rate that a state can impose on patent rents earned by its
own citizens. It may be the case that as a practical matter, states that grant IP protection to knowledge
goods generated by their own citizens are unlikely to negate the benefits of IP protection through tax
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One might question whether, as a practical matter, nation-states in fact
have the capacity to tax IP income earned by domestic innovators from foreign
sales. The slow progress of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project,
undertaken jointly by the OECD and the G20, might not inspire confidence on
this score.166 Our argument is not that nation-states are unconstrained in their
ability to tax; in many cases, however, the principal constraint on the taxation of
international IP income is political, not legal or technological. This is especially
true with respect to the United States: as one of us has argued, the President and
his Treasury Secretary already have the statutory authority to impose a presentperiod tax on income earned by corporations such as Apple and Google from
overseas sales.167 And even if a nation-state is limited in its capacity to tax overseas
income earned by domestic firms, it still has the option of making government
prizes and grants conditional on the recipient relinquishing IP rights to a
sovereign fund.
More fundamentally, if a state seeks to maximize the welfare of its citizens,
it doesn’t matter whether the government can capture the benefits to foreign
consumers as long as someone within the state does. If a federal grant to Stanford
leads to a cure for lung cancer, and Stanford patents it worldwide and licenses it
to Merck, then foreign consumers who benefit from the drug must pay a patent
“tax” to U.S. entities: Stanford and Merck. Even if the federal government
chooses not to reclaim any of those patent rents (such as by exempting Stanford
from paying taxes on this income), the benefit to foreign consumers is still
internalized within the United States. A state seeking to maximize the welfare of
its citizens would consider that benefit when choosing how much grant funding
for lung cancer to award in the first place. Or, in the language of our model, the
federal government would consider something closer to Bglobal(x) than BUS(x) when
setting its level of investment x for a lung cancer-related knowledge good, which
may push x closer to the global optimum.
Our argument has a potential application to the ongoing policy debate at
the domestic level in the United States regarding the Bayh-Dole Act, and to
debates over exporting Bayh-Dole to other countries. 168 Critics of Bayh-Dole
argue that the beneficiaries of public funding should be required—at least under
many circumstances—to place their inventions in the public domain.169 While we

laws. But any such limits on the taxation of patent rents arise from domestic political economy and
domestic (non-IP) law, not from the international IP regime.
166 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS, HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2716125 (concluding that BEPS is an “inadequate” response to global
tax avoidance because it continues to rely on taxing active income at the source and passive income at
residence, rather than the other way around).
167 See Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power To Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 21-24) (arguing that the President and his Treasury Secretary can, if they choose, bring
an end to the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” structure used by Apple, Google, and other technology
companies to defer U.S. tax on income from foreign sales).
168 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
169 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289, 310. For a review of the controversy surrounding the
Bayh-Dole Act and a critique of existing justifications for many Bayh-Dole patents, see Ian Ayres & Lisa
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are sympathetic to arguments for greater use of non-IP mechanisms for
incentivizing innovation and allocating access to knowledge goods at the domestic
level, we suggest (perhaps surprisingly) that Bayh-Dole may actually encourage the
use of alternatives to IP. The Bayh-Dole Act allows the United States to claim
partial compensation from consumers in other countries who benefit from U.S.funded research. The federal government may claim some of these benefits itself
through taxation of U.S. manufacturers; in other cases, the benefits flow to public
universities and to private research institutions that the federal government has
chosen to support through tax exemptions. 170 The important point is that
patenting the results of federally funded research allows the United States to
internalize some of the positive externalities generated through non-IP
investments in innovation.171 Insofar as the relevant knowledge goods are global
public goods and the United States is a rational self-interested actor, we expect
that the possibility of internalization will lead the U.S. to invest more in
knowledge-good production through non-IP mechanisms. In other words, IP
protection at the international level and non-IP innovation incentives at the
domestic level may be complements, not substitutes.
To the extent this flexibility in domestic innovation policy is desirable, our
analysis highlights a potential overlooked benefit of Bayh-Dole regimes. As a
number of scholars (including one of us) have pointed out, there are still significant
costs on the other side of the ledger, which may on net warrant reform.172 But we
think it is worth noting that the common concern that allowing IP protection on
publicly supported works requires U.S. taxpayers to “pay twice”173 overlooks the
point that not allowing IP protection permits non-U.S. consumers to avoid paying
at all. When combined with international IP treaties, Bayh-Dole regimes may
encourage states to increase direct public funding for research, alleviating
Scotchmer’s concern that IP treaties at the international level will cause “too little
public sponsorship” at the domestic level.174
Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2748375.
170 In 2014, six of the top ten universities ranked by life sciences licensing income were public
universities. See Brady Huggett, Top US Universities, Institutes for Life Sciences in 2014, 33 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1131 (2015).
171 This argument applies to prizes and tax incentives as well as grants, which are generally used as
complements to, not substitutes for, IP rights. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 316.
172 See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 169 (reviewing the scholarly consensus from works such as Rai
& Eisenberg, supra note 169, that the only compelling justification for Bayh-Dole patents is that they
provide an incentive to commercialize some new technologies, and proposing a “market test” to
determine the least amount of exclusivity under which a licensee will commercialize).
173 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and
Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2000) (“The public winds up paying twice for such
inventions, by both funding them and paying supracompetitive prices to use them.”); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1996) (arguing that Bayh-Dole “seems to require the public to pay
twice for the same invention”); Andrea Simon, Note, A Constitutional Analysis of Copyrighting GovernmentCommissioned Work, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 425, 428 (1984) (arguing that government-commissioned artistic
works should not be copyrightable because they are supported by “tens of billions of tax dollars
annually” and “[c]opyright . . . forces the public to pay twice”).
174 Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 415.
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All of this is not to say that TRIPS places zero limits on a producer state’s
innovation policy. To comply with TRIPS, a state must undertake the
administrative expense of maintaining an IP system, and it must conform its IP
system to a set of core rules. It may not, for instance, limit the term of copyrights
to less than 50 years or the term of patents to less than 20 years, nor may it refuse
to offer patents on inventions that are plainly patentable subject matter.
Nonetheless, we think the constraints of TRIPS should not be overstated. 175
TRIPS still leaves countries free to use non-IP innovation incentives, and it still
leaves states free to determine the size of the rewards that will go to domestic
producers of knowledge goods.
B. The Separability of International and Domestic Allocation
The international IP system also allows states substantial flexibility in
allocating knowledge goods at the domestic level. Imagine a world with two
countries—say, Japan and France—that agree to provide IP protection for
knowledge goods produced in the other country. If a Japanese firm receives a
French patent, France must enforce a prohibition on infringement of the patent
within French borders. Yet France remains free to decide that at the domestic
level, the knowledge good patented by the firm ought not be allocated via the
price mechanism. For instance, France may contract with the Japanese firm for an
exclusive license within French borders. France may then choose any mechanism
it wishes to allocate access domestically. It may, for example, auction off the
exclusive license to domestic firms and allow the auction winner to control access.
Alternatively, it may adopt an open-access approach whereby everyone in France
can practice the invention free of charge. The agreement between Japan and
France requires only that France pay the firm a bilaterally negotiated price for
access to the firm’s knowledge good or else enforce the firm’s patent. As long as
the firm and France strike a deal, France may choose from a wide menu of
domestic allocative options.
This example is far from fanciful. As Benjamin Roin notes, most
developed countries use a similar mechanism to allocate access to patented
pharmaceuticals. After a firm obtains a patent on a pharmaceutical product, it
generally agrees to sell the product in other countries at a government-set price.
Those countries’ governments can choose for themselves how to allocate access to
the product within their own borders (e.g., through a single-payer system or
through prescription drug insurance with a copay).176 For example, the United
Kingdom uses a system known as the Pharmaceutical Price Regulatory Scheme
(PPRS) to set prices for branded medicines; it then allocates access domestically
through its taxpayer-funded National Health Service. 177 If patent holders are
175 Cf. Ouellette, supra note 57, at 121–24 (noting that TRIPS does allow countries to experiment
with opt-in non-IP incentive systems, but lamenting the limits TRIPS places on experimentation with
substantive patent law).
176 Roin, supra note 9, at 1012–13.
177 U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION SCHEME 2014 (2013),
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/282523/
Pharmaceutical_Price_Regulation.pdf.
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unsatisfied with the PPRS price, they can choose to sell their products only on the
private market, for which U.K. citizens can buy private insurance or pay out of
pocket.178 For our purposes, the key point is that different countries can choose
different domestic allocation mechanisms even while subscribing to the same
global IP framework.
There is, however, a potential hurdle for states that seek to allocate goods
domestically through non-price mechanisms. In our hypothetical above, France
might not be willing to pay a fee to the Japanese firm for a license to distribute the
invention for free domestically if it thinks that its citizens will then resell the good
to consumers in other countries. (We say “might not” rather than “will not”:
French residents who resell the invention to foreign consumers still benefit—albeit
in the form of cash rather than from the invention itself.) And the Japanese firm,
for its part, might not be willing to sell a license to France if it thinks that French
citizens will then resell the good in other markets and undercut the Japanese firm’s
prices.
In practice, we see nation-states and patent holders going to great lengths
to make sure that knowledge goods distributed at a discount in one country are
not later resold elsewhere. One striking example of this phenomenon comes from
Egypt: Gilead Sciences, a pharmaceutical company based in California, has
agreed to license the hepatitis C drug sofosbuvir to the Egyptian government,
which then distributes the pills to its own citizens for free. Gilead sells sofosbuvir
under the brand name Sovaldi in the United States for $1,000 per one-a-day pill.
To prevent Egyptians from reselling sofosbuvir pills abroad and undercutting
Gilead’s price, Egypt requires that all pills be dispensed by government
pharmacies, and that all patients must hand in their last empty bottle in order to
obtain a new bottle. Moreover, as the New York Times reports, “Those receiving
new bottles must immediately unscrew the cap, break the seal and take the first
pill in front of the pharmacist—making it nearly impossible to resell the bottle.”179
The example of sofosbuvir in Egypt may be an extreme case, but other countries
that distribute knowledge goods to their own citizens on a non-price basis also
take measures to block resale. For example, Uruguay—which has provided free
laptops to hundreds of thousands of elementary school students and teachers—
uses a serial number tracking system to tie laptops to individual students and
requires that recipients of free laptops sign a declaration swearing not to resell the
computers.180
Significantly, patentees (and the nation-states that license knowledge goods
from patentees for domestic distribution) cannot necessarily rely on international
IP law to restrict resale. Under the doctrine known as international “first sale” or
“exhaustion,” the first authorized sale (including a free distribution) of an IP178 Thus, when negotiating with the National Health Service, a patentee should not be willing to
accept less in total profits than it could receive from these alternatives.
179 Donald G. McNeil Jr., Curing Hepatitis C, in an Experiment the Size of Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/health/hepatitis-c-treatment-egypt.html.
180
¿Cómo
Acceder
a
la
Compra
de
un
Equipo
Ceibal?,
PLAN
CEIBAL,
http://www.ceibal.edu.uy/art%C3%ADculo/preguntas-frecuentes/compra/Como-acceder-a-lacompra-de-un-equipo-Ceibal (last updated Jan. 28, 2015).
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protected good in one country may exhaust IP rights in that good, such that the
rightsholder cannot limit resale. 181 The U.S. Supreme Court recently held in
Kirtsaeng v. Wiley that international exhaustion applies to copies of a copyrighted
work lawfully made abroad, 182 but the en banc Federal Circuit decided that
Kirtsaeng does not change the current rule that foreign sales do not exhaust U.S.
patent rights.183 There is currently no international standard on IP exhaustion;
rather, TRIPS explicitly states that “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”184 The absence
of an international no-exhaustion rule potentially limits (but does not eliminate)
the ability of nation-states to prevent the resale of subsidized goods to consumers
abroad.
***
The observations in this Section and the last one can be combined: the
international IP system establishes a framework for setting the size of transfers
between nation-states that consume knowledge goods and nation-states that
produce knowledge goods, but it does not dictate how nation-states reward
knowledge-good producers within their own borders, not does it dictate how
nation-states distribute knowledge goods to their own citizens. A TRIPS signatory
state may still choose non-IP mechanisms both for incentivizing innovation and
for allocating access to knowledge goods at the domestic level. Regardless of what
mechanisms it uses at the domestic level, a knowledge-good-producing nationstate retains the option of using the international IP system to demand that other
countries share in the cost of producing global public goods, with the specifics of
that cost-sharing to be determined via separate negotiations.
For example, the United States could—consistent with TRIPS—establish
a taxpayer-financed prize for the first inventor to patent a vaccine for the common
cold, with the condition that any inventor claiming the prize must surrender the
patent to the federal government. The federal government could then make the
vaccine available domestically for free while charging for the right to practice the
patent overseas. The U.S. and another country (say, the U.K.) could then strike a
deal whereby the U.K. pays an annual fee to the U.S. in exchange for the right to
distribute the vaccine within the U.K.’s borders. And the U.K. could then
distribute the vaccine to its own citizens for free or at a discount. In this example,
the U.S. does not use the patent system to incentivize innovation at the domestic
level, and neither it nor the U.K. uses the price mechanism to allocate access.
Yet even in cases like the example above—where the producer state opts
for a non-IP incentive mechanism and the consumer state chooses to allocate
access on a basis other than price—TRIPS remains relevant to the outcome. That
181 Under U.S. law, “patentees cannot circumvent the application of patent exhaustion principles by
distributing a product embodying the patent for free.” LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC,
734 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
182 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
183 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., No. 2014-1617, 2016 WL 559042 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 12, 2016). We examine this international patent exhaustion issue in greater depth in a forthcoming
essay. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19.
184 TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 6.
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is because TRIPS sets a baseline for negotiations between producers and
consumers regarding cost-sharing. To continue with the formal model from above
(with SB still the consumer nation-state and SA the producer), TRIPS sets a floor of
PB|monopoly on the transfer from SB to SA (TBàA). The profit that SA can extract from
SB if it sells the relevant knowledge good at a monopoly price in SB functions as a
floor on TBàA because SA will reject any lower offer from SB in licensing talks.
(Note that SB almost certainly could not ban trade in the relevant good without
running afoul of WTO rules.185) At the same time, the doctrine of international
exhaustion may make it difficult for SA to extract significantly more than PB|monopoly
from SB. If, for example, SA sought to demand a licensing fee from SB in excess of
PB|monopoly, SB could seek to acquire the relevant knowledge good on the secondary
market and avoid transacting directly with SA.
To be sure, these conclusions come with caveats, and we conclude this
Part with three limits on TRIPS’s effectiveness at setting TBàA. First, this model is
obviously inapplicable for the many knowledge goods that nation-states are not
required to protect under TRIPS, ranging from hygiene checklists for intensivecare units186 to results of failed research projects.187 TRIPS thus does little to
require a state that benefits from these goods from compensating the state the
produces them. Accordingly, if a producing state seeks to maximize the welfare of
its citizens, it has little incentive to consider foreign benefits when setting its level
of investment in goods for which the international IP system fails to enable
appropriability. If there is a global underinvestment problem, states may thus
need to turn to non-IP coordination mechanisms.188
A second qualification is that, even for goods that are clearly protectable
with IP, SB may decrease TBàA by threatening to exercise its rights to issue a
compulsory license under Article 31 of TRIPS. That provision allows a signatory
state to make use of a patent without the holder’s authorization, although the state
still must provide “adequate remuneration” to the patent holder, “taking into
account the economic value of the authorization.”189 (Except in cases of “national

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. XI, § 1 (“No prohibitions or restrictions
other than duties, taxes or other charges . . . shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party [(unless a specific
exception applies)] . . . .”).
185

186 See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE
L.J. 1900 (2013).
187 See Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041 (2012).
188 For example, Nicholson Price has explained that the nascent field of “black-box medicine”—
complex computational models used for health care—depends on knowledge goods that are not
protectable under many IP laws: (1) aggregated data; (2) algorithms; and (3) validation. W. Nicholson
Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 443–46 (2015). He thus argues for increased
use of grants and prizes in these areas. Id. at 449–54. Given the high cost and likely global benefits of
developing black-box medical algorithms, id. at 437–42, a global black-box medicine institute might be
worthwhile.

TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31. From January 1995 to June 2011, there were 24 instances in which
countries threatened to issue compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals, most of which ended in either
compulsory licenses or voluntary price reductions. Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS MED. e1001154 (2012).
Aggressive price regulation may delay the launch of new drugs in that state. See Iain M. Cockburn, Jean
189
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emergency,” a signatory state also must make “efforts to obtain authorization
from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms” before it can make
unauthorized use of the patent.190)
A third caveat is that if SA can prevent other purchasers of the relevant
knowledge good from reselling to SB, then SA might attempt to demand a payment
from SB in excess of PB|monopoly. If SA has complete control over resale, such that SB
can acquire the relevant knowledge good only through a direct transaction with SA,
then TBàA could conceivably take any value in the range [PB|monopoly, BB(x)]. Yet
even in that extreme case, TRIPS effectively sets an upper bound of BB(x) on the
transfer TBàA from SB to SA. SB will never (or never rationally) pay more for a
knowledge good than it stands to benefit from making the knowledge good freely
available to its own citizens. As we discuss below, this last feature of the
international IP regime is a potentially significant benefit relative to other
mechanisms for setting the size of transfers from consumer states to producer
states.

IV. Alternatives to International IP Law
So far, we have argued that for a subset of knowledge goods, coordination
among nation-states can address the underinvestment problem—i.e., the problem
that nation-states acting on their own will invest in the production of global
knowledge goods at less than the socially optimal level. We have also argued that
the international IP regime offers at least a partial solution to the problem: by
requiring consumer nation-states to make transfers to nation-states that produce
global knowledge goods, international IP law ensures that producer states
internalize at least some of the cross-border benefits generated by their (and their
citizens’) knowledge production efforts. It is not immediately obvious, however,
why nation-states have chosen international IP law as the framework for
determining those transfers. As we discussed in Section I.A, states generally
subsidize the production of knowledge goods through a range of mechanisms
beyond IP laws. By the same token, nation-states conceivably could use non-IP
mechanisms to mediate transfers between consumer states and producer states.
Why, then, have nation-states united on IP treaties rather than arrangements
involving alternatives to IP?191
One answer might be that alternatives to IP such as prizes, grants, and tax
credits require some sort of public finance system, and there is no global public
finance system (or, at least, not much of one). Suzanne Scotchmer argued that IP
treaties exist because “there are no institutions to harmonize public spending, and

O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patents and the Global Diffusion of New Drugs (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20492, 2014).
190 Id. art. 31(b).
191 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (describing such proposals). We are unaware of any
proposals for global treaties using non-IP incentive mechanisms for creative works—another indication
that international IP scholars should be wary of lumping patents and copyright under one umbrella.

5/9/16

KNOWLEDGE GOODS AND NATION-STATES

46

there are no international mechanisms to repatriate the spillovers it generates.”192
To be sure, there are international finance institutions with limited policy
objectives, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (the latter of
which has invested more than $18 billion in R&D efforts over the past decade193).
But this is perhaps no more than a quibble; a more substantive objection is that
Scotchmer’s answer just repeats the question. Why have countries chosen to
coordinate on IP instead of non-IP mechanisms? It is no response to say: because
they haven’t set up non-IP mechanisms.
This Part attempts to offer a more thorough answer to the “why
international IP?” question. Our account is partly explanatory and partly
justificatory. That is, our goal is not only to understand why—as a positive
matter—nation-states have chosen international IP laws as a coordination
mechanism, but also to explain why—as a normative matter—coordination
around IP makes sense. Importantly, the two questions are not entirely separate.
The puzzle of why states have chosen to coordinate on IP—and why the
international IP system has persisted—becomes less of a puzzle the more rational
that decision seems to be. Even if our account does not perfectly describe the
thoughts that went through the minds of government officials when they chose to
coordinate on IP in the first place, it helps to explain why the regime has proven
to be relatively stable.
Our account is not a simple story about administrative costs. We are
agnostic as to whether the administrative costs of the international IP regime are
higher or lower than the administrative costs of alternative coordination
mechanisms. Indeed, if the function of international IP law is to establish a
framework for setting the size of transfers from consumer nation-states to
producer nation-states, then IP might seem like a very cumbersome means of
achieving that objective. Rather than relying on the administrative costs
justification, we instead focus on two features of the international IP regime that
strike us as normatively attractive: (1) International IP law leaves nation-states
with significant flexibility to develop their own mechanisms for incentivizing
innovation and allocating access to knowledge goods; (2) International IP law sets
reasonable bounds on the size of transfer payments from consumer nation-states
to producer nation-states.
In Section IV.A, we explain our doubts about the administrative-costs
justification for IP as a coordination mechanism. In Section IV.B, we consider
alternative arguments for and against an international IP regime. We close in
Section IV.C with a consideration of the distributive effects of international IP
and its alternatives.

192 Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 415; see also SANDLER, supra note 84, at 76 (“The absence of a
supranational government with taxing authority make the standard tools of public finance . . . more
difficult to apply at the transnational level.”).
193 World
Bank Group Support for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, WORLD BANK GRP.,
http://ieg.worldbank.org/evaluations/world-bank-group-support-innovation-and-entrepreneurship
(last visited Jan 24, 2016).
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A. The Administrative Costs Story
We have argued that the international IP system serves as a mechanism for
setting the size of transfers between states that consume knowledge goods and
states that produce those goods. Yet IP is not the only conceivable mechanism for
mediating those transfers. One could imagine a regime whereby each nation-state
agrees to contribute a fixed percentage of GDP to an international organization,
and the organization then chooses promising research projects to finance with
grants. Alternatively or additionally, the international organization could offer
prizes to the first inventor who comes up with a vaccine for a particular disease or
a treatment achieving specific results. Or perhaps the organization could simply
set the size of TBàA at the end of each year based on each country’s consumption
and production of knowledge goods over the previous twelve months (e.g., “South
Korea—your idea for transparent trucks was a clever way to reduce road
accidents, so you deserve compensation from other states”194).
The international IP regime may have advantages over these alternatives,
but is one of those advantages the fact that IP saves on administrative costs? The
answer is not obviously “yes.” The rules of the global IP system may seem
straightforward: countries are required to grant copyrights for creative works and
patents for technical inventions for a set period of time (under TRIPS, no less than
50 years from publication for copyrights and 20 years from filing for patents195),
and are required to conform their IP laws to other specifications set forth in
treaties. In practice, however, the global IP system is often costly and inefficient.
The costs of acquiring international patent protection include filing fees for each
jurisdiction, costs of local patent attorneys or other representatives, and translation
costs, making the process infeasible for all but large companies.196 Licensing and
enforcement costs are also significant. We have previously estimated the
administrative cost of U.S. patent acquisition and litigation (but not including
negotiation and licensing costs) to be on the order of $10 billion per year.197
Copyright is far less costly on the acquisition side due to the international ban on
copyright “formalities”198 but copyrighted works (unlike patents) are not indexed
or searchable. This, in turn, leads to transaction, negotiation, and litigation costs
that often exceed the benefit from using a copyrighted work.199
The effectiveness of the current international IP system at setting the size
of transfers between states also depends on highly variable substantive and
procedural rules at the domestic level. IP rightsholders have complained of

194 See Heather Kelly, Samsung Working To Make Trucks ‘Transparent,’ CNN MONEY, June 22, 2015,
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/22/technology/samsung-safety-truck.
195 TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 12 & 33.
196 See TRIMBLE, supra note 78, 35.
197 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 365.
198 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 9(1) (incorporating Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention);
Berne Convention, supra note 47, art. 5(2) (specifying that copyrights “shall not be subject to any
formality”).
199 See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION (2015)
(describing the high costs of finding owners for many copyrighted works).
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difficulty enforcing their rights in many countries, including not only China200 and
India, 201 but also higher-income countries such as Japan 202 and Italy. 203 The
availability and speed of injunctions and damages varies significantly between
countries.204 IP rightsholders also face significant uncertainty about whether a
given knowledge good will be protected in a given country. Even in the United
States, patentable subject matter and copyright fair use are difficult to specify with
any precision.205
To be clear, we are not arguing against variation in domestic TRIPS
implementation; there are many benefits to an expansive interpretation of TRIPS
flexibilities.206 Our point is merely that the international IP system has significant
costs for both private users and for nation-states that want to ensure their treaty
partners are in compliance.207 Thus, whatever the justification for using IP as a
coordination mechanism, it cannot be because coordination on IP is easy.
International IP laws are difficult to design and even more difficult to enforce.
Of course, alternatives to international IP cannot be implemented
costlessly either. But there are a number of examples of successful international
coordination on incentives for technical knowledge beyond patent law, suggesting
that alternatives may indeed be feasible—or at least no less feasible than global
patent treaties. Countries have often collaborated on joint scientific endeavors in
which they each contribute direct funding. The International Space Station has
cost approximately €100 billion, split over almost thirty years among the United

200 See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 345 (2013).
201 See India Last in Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement Rankings, ECONOMIC TIMES (Jan. 30,
2014),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-01-30/news/46828590_1_propertyprotection-india-protection-and-enforcement.
202 See H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Competition Law and Patent Protection in Japan: A Half-Century of Progress, A
New Millennium of Challenges, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 71, 82 (2002) (“Limited discovery, limited use of
expert witnesses, high burdens of proof of causation and damages, and the absence of judicial authority
to increase damages for willful infringement, as well as high attorneys’ fees and filing fees have all been
cited as features of the Japanese IP enforcement system that deprive IP owners of a meaningful private
remedy for infringement in Japanese courts.”).
203 The defensive strategy of filing a declaratory judgment action in Italy—with its notoriously slow
procedures—to delay patent litigation elsewhere in Europe was so widespread that it became known as
the “Italian torpedo.” See Claudia Rehse, The ‘Torpedo’: Recent Developments in Europe, INTELLECTUAL
PROP. MAG., April 2014, at 76, 77.
204 See generally COTTER, supra note 200 (comparing patent remedies).
205 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 J. SCI. & TECH. L. (forthcoming); Paul
Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433 (2008). Given the difficulty of creating one
workable system of fair use, it is perhaps unsurprising that TRIPS does no better at standardizing
limitations on copyright than a vague three-part test: “Members shall confine limitations and exceptions
to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder.” TRIPS, supra note 14,
art. 13.
206 See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text.
207 In theory it might be possible to design a system of truly global IP protection and enforcement,
but it is not obvious that the negotiation and administration costs of such a system would be an
improvement on the status quo.

5/9/16

KNOWLEDGE GOODS AND NATION-STATES

49

States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and ten European countries.208 Another massive
scientific collaboration, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at the European
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), has an operating budget of about $1
billion per year, which was split among twenty-three member countries plus
additional observing countries (such as the United States) in 2014. 209 Amy
Kapczynski has described the transnational network of influenza scientists who
produce annual flu vaccines, for which the estimated $56 million annual budget
comes “almost exclusively from public sources.”210
Some attempt toward larger-scale cross-border coordination on R&D has
been made in the European Union. Since the 2000s, the European Commission
has set broad innovation-related framework goals, including an objective of
increasing R&D spending as a percentage of GDP to 1% for public spending and
3% for all spending. 211 Although the specific spending goals are nonbinding,
reviews have concluded that this framework has led to a “dramatically increased
focus on science and technology in national political agendas”212 and some crossborder policy learning.213
While nation-states have experimented with several non-IP coordination
mechanisms (and scholars have suggested still other possible approaches214), this
does not mean the space for solutions to the underinvestment problem has been
thoroughly mined. Perhaps the most intriguing possibilities arise with respect to
goods for which the marginal return from additional investment falls to zero after
a certain point. So long as one country invests up to that point, there is no need
(and no use) for additional investment. For such goods, states may actually face an
anti-coordination problem (more akin to “chicken” than to a prisoners’
dilemma215). This will be the case if multiple countries would have an incentive to
208 How Much Does It Cost?, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities
/Human_Spaceflight/International_Space_Station/How_much_does_it_cost (last updated May 14,
2013); see also NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., FY 2016 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET REQUEST
SUMMARY 1 (2015) (budgeting over $3 billion per year for the U.S. contribution to the International
Space Station).
209 See Alex Knapp, How Much Does it Cost To Find a Higgs Boson?, FORBES (July 5, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2012/07/05/how-much-does-it-cost-to-find-a-higgs-boson;
Facts and Figures 2014, CERN PRESS OFFICE, http://press.web.cern.ch/facts-and-figures/facts-andfigures-2014 (last visited Jan 24, 2016); Don Lincoln, US Participation in the Higgs Discovery, SYMMETRY
(Oct. 1 2013), http://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/october-2013/us-participation-in-the-higgsdiscovery.
210 Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: The Flu Network as a Case Study
in Open Science (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
211 See generally Ouellette, supra note 57, at 114-15 (describing this framework).
212 Nina McGuinness & Conor O’Carroll, Benchmarking Europe’s Lab Benches: How Successful Has the
OMC Been in Research Policy?, 48 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 293, 307 (2010).
213 EXPERT GRP. FOR THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE RESEARCH ASPECTS OF THE REVISED LISBON
STRATEGY, EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION IN RESEARCH POLICY:
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25–26, 29 (2009); see also Ouellette, supra note 57, at 115 (citing
additional sources).
214 See supra notes 16–17, 58–60 and accompanying text.
215 “Chicken” is an anti-coordination game in which the optimal outcome is for players to take
opposite actions, but each player prefers for the other to take the more costly action (i.e., each would
prefer to have the other country invest). See 3 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 41, at 1487.
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develop the good in a world without trade. Put differently, a chicken problem
exists if, for multiple states Si, Bi'(x) > C'(x) for all x ≤ xglobal*, after which Bglobal'(x) <
C'(x). (Here, Bi'(x) and Bglobal'(x) are discontinuous at xglobal* due to a kink in Bi(x) and
Bglobal(x) at that point.) Thus, the globally optimal outcome can be achieved if any
one country invests xglobal*.
Under these circumstances, too many countries have an incentive to develop
the good, so each has some incentive to wait and hope the others will produce the
knowledge first. In other words, provision of these goods is hampered by freeriding but not by uncompensated externalities. Since Bi'(x) > C'(x) for all x ≤ xglobal*,
the fact that Bi'(x) < Bglobal'(x) is not an obstacle to optimal investment. Rather, the
problem is that states are prone to act strategically—and thus to invest less than
they would under autarky with the hope that another country will pick up the
slack.
A concrete example may help illustrate. Imagine that researchers identify
a new chemical compound that holds promise as a cure for heart disease, and that
a clinical trial to determine whether the compound is effective costs an estimated
$100 million. Given that heart disease is one of the leading causes of death
worldwide,216 the expected benefits of conducting this trial likely exceeds its cost in
many countries. Imagine, in a world without IP treaties or other coordination,
that the United States, Germany, and Japan are each debating whether to finance
the trial. Under autarky—i.e., if each country were a closed economy—each
would immediately proceed. But given knowledge flows across borders, each will
hope that one of the other countries will undertake the cost. This mutual waiting
may have desirable effect of preventing duplicative investment. But it also may
result in no state investing at all.
For this type of good (which one might call chicken-type goods217), one
imaginable solution is an anti-R&D treaty. For example, if Germany and Japan
can credibly commit not to finance the trial, then the good becomes a cranberrytype good from the perspective of the United States: either the United States will
produce the good (which is in its interest), or the good won’t be produced. For the
anti-R&D treaty to succeed, it must draw the support of all but one country with
the capability and incentive to produce the good under autarky.218 Concededly,
216 See Anthony S. Kim & S. Claiborne Johnston, Global Variation in the Relative Burden of Stroke and
Ischemic Heart Disease, 124 CIRCULATION 314, 318 fig.1B (2011) (showing that ischemic heart disease is
one of the leading causes of death worldwide, with a burden that is relatively uniformly distributed).
217 Not only do these goods present a game of chicken, but knowledge about the health effects of
eating chicken might fall into this category, given widespread global chicken consumption. See Roberto
A. Ferdman, The Coming Global Domination of Chicken, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (July 14, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/14/the-coming-global-dominationof-chicken.

Alternatively, an anti-R&D treaty might draw the support of all but two countries with the
capacity and incentive to produce the relevant knowledge good themselves under autarky, thus
reducing the coordination challenge for the two remaining countries to a bilateral cooperation game.
More generally, if n equals the total number of countries with the capacity and incentive to produce the
relevant knowledge goods themselves under autarky, then an anti-R&D treaty with n – x signatories
reduces the challenge of producing the knowledge good from an n-country game to an x-country game.
Only when x = 1 does the anti-R&D treaty eliminate the free-riding risk, but an anti-R&D treaty with x
> 1 may still make production of the knowledge good more likely.
218
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we know of no example of such an anti-R&D treaty in practice: countries have
sought to implement anti-R&D treaties in other contexts (such as cloning-related
research219 and nuclear weapons research220), but the goal in those cases was for
the treaty to cover all n nation-states rather than n – 1 states. Our point is not to
push the anti-R&D treaty as a viable alternative to the international IP regime,
but instead to emphasize that there are numerous imaginable solutions to distinct
coordination problems for different types of knowledge goods.
Finally, while large-scale R&D treaties (or anti-R&D treaties) are not
observed in the real world, tax treaties are. And tax treaties, like IP treaties, can
address the free-rider problems highlighted by the standard account above.
Countries can agree not to tax (or to tax at reduced rates) profits on knowledge
goods, thus amping up incentives for innovation. Indeed, the Model OECD
Convention implements a system somewhat like this: if a resident of Country X
receives revenue from the use of her patent in Country Y, she is not taxed in
Country Y unless she “carries on business” in Country Y “in which the royalties
arise through a permanent establishment situated therein and the right or
property in respect of which the royalties are paid is effectively connected with
such permanent establishment.”221
In short, we see no a priori reason why the transaction costs involved in
negotiating and enforcing an international IP treaty are likely to be lower than the
costs of other potential coordination mechanisms. Indeed, one might think that
international IP law is quite a cumbersome way to set the size of TBàA. If the case
for international IP rests on the administrative costs story, it is an uneasy case
indeed.
B. A Qualified Defense of International IP Treaties
In our view, a stronger argument for international IP law as a mechanism
for setting the size of transfers from consumer nation-states to producer nationstates arises out of our observations in Part III regarding the separability of
international and domestic IP policy. Those observations might translate into a
normative argument in favor of a global IP accord along the lines of TRIPS: such
an accord allows each signatory state to decide for itself how it will incentivize
innovation and allocate access to knowledge goods at the domestic level, while
also allowing producer states to pass some of the production costs along to other
countries that use knowledge goods. In other words, TRIPS allows each country a
measure of autonomy at the domestic level, subject only to the constraint that no
country can use a knowledge good generated in another signatory state without
the other state’s consent (or without the consent of the inventor in the other state
who patented the product in question).
219 See Warren Hoge, U.S. Drops Effort for Treaty Banning Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/20/world/us-drops-effort-for-treaty-banning-cloning.html.
220 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
221 ORG. FOR ECON.
AND ON CAPITAL art.

convention-articles.pdf.

& COOP. DEV., MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME
12 (2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/2014-model-tax-
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To be sure, the use of IP as a global coordination mechanism does not
guarantee total freedom of choice for individual states with respect to innovation
incentives and allocation of access at the domestic level. As discussed above, each
TRIPS signatory must maintain an IP system and must offer rewards at least as
attractive as those a knowledge producer could expect from IP. A country’s right
to use knowledge goods originating elsewhere also remains subject to the
producer’s veto. And the potential for bargaining frictions is considerable, as
producers and consumer nations each seek to capture the surplus from trade. So
too, the use of IP as a global coordination mechanism is likely to lead to a transfer
of wealth from nations that are primarily users to nations that are primarily
producers. (We consider this issue in Section IV.C.)
Moreover, this “autonomy advantage” is not entirely unique to IP. If, for
instance, TRIPS were replaced by a global prize system financed by mandatory
national contributions, individual countries still could adopt alternative
mechanisms to encourage domestic innovation and still could use a price
mechanism to allocate access to knowledge goods at the domestic level. For
example, imagine that a global prize fund offers a reward for the first team to
invent a successful vaccine for the common cold. The United States could decide
that intramural government research is the most promising strategy for coming up
with a cure and could assign a group of scientists at the NIH to pursue the project.
If the NIH scientists were the first to succeed, the federal government could claim
the prize itself. And if the United States thought that access to the cold vaccine
should be allocated on a user-pays basis, it could finance its contribution to the
global fund by imposing a tax or fee on patients who receive the vaccine.
Other potential international policies are somewhat “stickier,” in the sense
that they make it harder for any one country to adopt a different approach. Say
that countries agree to establish an international R&D organization, again funded
through mandatory national contributions, that will dispense grants to university
researchers across the globe who are pursuing promising projects. A country that
preferred to rely on the market (or on intramural research) could still do so, but it
would have no way of getting other states to share a portion of the costs. The
country could, though, still choose how to finance its contribution to the
international organization—e.g., through a broad-based tax or through a targeted
tax on knowledge goods that replicates the user-pays aspect of the IP system. So
while it is not the case that all potential international innovation policies are
completely separable from domestic ones, it is the case that convergence around
an international IP regime, an international prize fund, or an international R&D
organization would still leave wide leeway for states to choose different ways to
finance innovation themselves.
The international IP regime is distinct from alternative coordination
mechanisms such as a global prize fund or a global R&D organization in one
important respect: as noted above, the transfer from a consumer nation-state to a
producer nation-state in an international IP regime (TBàA) is bounded. Even with
some amount of price discrimination, TBàA ≤ BB(x). A producer cannot charge a
consumer state more than the consumer state stands to benefit from the
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producer’s knowledge good. The consumer state will reject any deal that requires
it to pay more than it gets.
To be sure, there may be cases in which a patent is granted for an
invention that is obvious, or in which a patent is granted to an applicant who was
not the first discoverer. Note, though, that consumer nation-states retain a
powerful hedge against this risk: they can decline to grant a patent for any
invention that is not “new” or that does not “involve an inventive step.”222 Thus,
if producer nation-state SA grants a patent to a domestic applicant for an
“invention” that is obvious, and the domestic applicant then seeks protection in
SB, then SB has the option to deny the application.223 If SA disagrees with that
determination, its only legal recourse is to resort to the dispute resolution
mechanisms set forth in TRIPS.
No such assurance exists with respect to a global prize fund or a global
R&D organization. As discussed above, nation-states are likely to favor spending
on knowledge goods for which domestic benefits are large relative to global
benefits: the United States, for example, almost certainly has more interest in
treating diabetes than treating diarrheal diseases (even though the two types of
ailments kill approximately the same number of people worldwide each year224).
Depending on who controls the levers of power, a global prize fund or global
R&D organization might divert more of its spending to “first-world problems”
than to the dilemmas facing lesser-developed nations. And it seems to us a safe
assumption that wealthier nations will exert outsized influence on whatever
international institution might replace the IP regime. At the very least, the
international IP regime has the following argument going for it: Citizens of poorer
countries don’t have to pay for knowledge goods that they don’t use. A global
prize fund or global R&D organization financed by mandatory national
contributions offers no such guarantee.
Our focus on the separability of international and domestic innovation
incentives also suggests that some of the criticisms of international IP law are
misplaced. Consider, for example, Scotchmer’s worry that international IP law
will lead to deadweight losses that could be avoided if R&D were publicly
financed.225 This concern follows from the view that the IP shadow tax, as the
equivalent of a concentrated sales tax, imposes greater deadweight losses than
other innovation incentivizes financed via broad-based taxation. 226 But as we
emphasized in Part III, harmonized IP protections at the international level do
not preclude any individual nation from relying on broad-based taxation to
finance the allocation of knowledge goods at the domestic level: absent a complete
TRIPS, supra note 14, at art. 27(1).
See id. art. 27(1) n.5 (“For the purposes of this Article, the term[] ‘inventive step’ . . . may be
deemed by a Member to be synonymous with . . . ‘non-obvious’ . . . .”).
222
223

The Top 10 Causes of Death, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets
/fs310/en (last updated May 2014). Diabetes is much more prevalent in high-income countries, and
death from diarrheal disease is much more common in low-income countries.
225 Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 436.
224

226 Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 54 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds., 2002).
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bargaining breakdown, a state will be able to purchase a license to a patented
knowledge good from the producer at a price equal to or less than the value of the
good to its own citizens, and can then choose to make the good available to its
own citizens at marginal cost (or for free). So even if proprietary pricing does
impose greater deadweight loss than broad-based taxation, that does not mean
that harmonized IP protection is itself inefficient.
At any rate, the assumption that proprietary pricing imposes greater
deadweight loss than taxation does not necessarily hold for all countries. The
assumption depends on the existence of a reasonably efficient domestic finance
system—a condition not everywhere found. Countries differ dramatically in the
structure of their tax systems and in the size of the resulting deadweight loss from
revenue raising. 227 Meanwhile, the deadweight loss from proprietary pricing
under an IP regime depends on the elasticity of demand for the patented product.
For instance, if demand is perfectly inelastic (i.e., if consumers will purchase the
same quantity regardless of price), then the deadweight loss of proprietary pricing
is zero.228 In that event, reliance on IP will be more efficient than all but the ideal
tax system.229
The efficiency of conventional public finance mechanisms versus the IP
shadow tax will vary not only with the efficiency of the tax system, but also with
other characteristics of the state, including both its bureaucratic capabilities and
political economy constraints on what policies it is able to promulgate. Amy
Kapczynski notes that the IP literature “typically describe[s] the state in its first
instance as inertial, heavy, bureaucratic, ill-informed, and perilously corruptible
and corrupt.”230 Mariana Mazzucato has recently challenged this view, arguing
that for numerous breakthrough technologies, the state has in fact acted as “a lead
risk taker and market shaper” rather than “an inert bandage for areas
underserved by the market.”231 We do not think that either one of these visions
will always prevail. Government-set rewards depend on state officials acting in the
public interest, and are thus unlikely to succeed in nation-states with high levels of
corruption or inefficient bureaucracies. 232 Market-set rewards such as tax
incentives233 and patents give less discretion to state officials, but they still depend
227 See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government, 46 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 335 tbl.D1 (2003) (showing summary statistics for measures of tax efficiency).
228 MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43 n.11 (2004).
229 For a more elaborate argument suggesting that the optimal innovation policy involves a mix of
proprietary pricing and financing through broad-based taxation, see E. Glen Weyl & Jean Tirole,
Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1971 (2003).
230 Kapcyznski, supra note 5, at 131–32.
231 MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC
SECTOR MYTHS 9–10 (2013).

VS.

PRIVATE

Cf. Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org
/cpi2014 (last visited Jan 24, 2016) (reporting perceived public sector corruption across countries).
232

233 The description of tax incentives as a “market-set reward” may surprise readers unfamiliar with
our prior work. Elsewhere, we have noted that in the case of R&D tax credits and patent boxes,
“nongovernment actors decide which inventions are worth pursuing and which projects are most likely
to yield the inventions in question,” while “[t]he government simply enhances the ultimate reward.”
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 332.
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on the ability of the state to design efficient systems for screening the projects that
receive either type of reward.
The key point is this: For some products and in some countries,
proprietary pricing will be more efficient than taxation as a means of raising
revenue to finance innovation, while for other products and in other countries, the
reverse will be true. Accordingly, efficiency considerations do not weigh decidedly
in one direction or another in the IP-versus-non-IP debate. Efficiency
considerations do suggest, however, that optimal innovation policy is country- and
case-specific. A prize system may be inefficient for countries in which the
deadweight loss from taxation is high and demand for the prized invention is
inelastic. At the same time, another country with a better-functioning tax
system—and where demand for the relevant knowledge good is more elastic—
may want to finance innovation through broad-based taxation rather than
propriety pricing. Thus, to the extent that efficiency arguments point in any
direction, they weigh in favor of global arrangements that allow for diversity and
maximize domestic autonomy.
C. Distributive Considerations
Critics of the international IP regime frequently focus on the distributive
consequences of IP rights.234 According to Peter Gerhart, “[i]t is the distributive
dimension of intellectual property policy that makes existing international
institutions such an unsound mechanism for determining global rules for
intellectual policy.” 235 Gene Grossman and Edwin Lai conclude that
harmonization of IP protections across countries “has more to do with distribution
than with efficiency, and that incorporation of such provisions in a treaty like
TRIPS might well benefit the North at the expense of the South.”236
We do not dispute the claim that international IP treaties such as TRIPS,
insofar as they strengthen IP protections in consumer countries, will increase the
wealth of information-producing nations. But international IP treaties are only
one element within the constellation of policies affecting the global distribution of
wealth. Every year, industrialized nations transfer significant sums of wealth to
poorer countries—through official development assistance as well as other
mechanisms. In 2013, official development assistance from 28 wealthy countries
to poorer nations totaled $134.8 billion.237 Wealthy countries enjoy substantial
autonomy over the amount and allocation of their foreign aid budgets—a fact that
no international IP treaty can change. Thus, if an international IP treaty such as
TRIPS enriches wealthy countries at the expense of their poorer counterparts,
wealthy countries can offset that redistribution of wealth via direct transfers.
Conversely, if TRIPS were replaced by an IP regime that shifts wealth to poorer
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007 MICH. L. REV. 143, 144; see also supra note 55.
236 Grossman & Lai, supra note 5, at 1650.
234
235

237
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Reaches
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THE
GUARDIAN,
April
8,
2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/08/foreign-aid-spending-developingcountries.
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countries, wealthy nations could counterbalance that shift by reducing their
foreign aid outlays.238 At the end of the day, wealthy nations decide whether—and
how much—they wish to redistribute wealth across borders. Unless a new IP
regime results in a North-to-South redistribution of wealth that exceeds the
existing amount of foreign aid (a possibility we think unlikely239), international IP
treaties will affect the form—but not the sum total—of global wealth
redistribution.
This is not to say that the distributive consequences of international IP
treaties are nil. International IP treaties likely lead to transfers of wealth among
industrialized nations—transfers that cannot be offset through changes in the
amount of foreign aid (since industrialized nations do not typically give foreign aid
to each other).240 Some might consider such transfers to be normatively desirable
based on a user-pays principle.241 Others might argue that even if the distributive
consequences of international IP treaties are largely limited to the industrialized
world, egalitarians ought to oppose policies resulting in wealth transfers from
industrialized nations with lower per-capita GDPs to the United States and
Germany (the primary TRIPS beneficiaries). Note, though, that the international
IP regime does not always benefit richer industrialized nations at the expense of
middle-income ones: some of the net losers from TRIPS (e.g., Norway) have
higher per capita incomes than some of the net winners (e.g., Italy).242 The key
point is that once one recognizes that the North-South distributive consequences
of international IP treaties can largely be offset through adjustments to foreign aid,
the normative debate over international IP treaties takes on a different tone. One
might favor the redistribution of wealth from industrialized nations to developing
countries while also believing that user-pays is an appropriate framework for
allocating the costs of information production within the industrialized world. On
that view, the distributive consequences of international IP treaties such as TRIPS
begin to look quite attractive.

238 Just because wealthy nations could counterbalance redistribution through IP with adjustments in
foreign aid doesn’t mean that they would. As discussed in Sections II.C and II.D, the behavior of nationstates is not always best described through rational actor models, and it is possible that domestic
lobbyists could be more successful pushing for IP rules that benefit foreign countries than for more
direct foreign aid.
239 By one estimate, TRIPS resulted in a net rent transfer of $5.76 billion (in 1995 dollars) to the
United States. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
184 tbl.6.1 (2000); see also Phillip McCalman, Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International
Patent Harmonization, 55 J. INT’L ECON. 161, 179 tbl.4 (2001) (estimating that TRIPS resulted in a net
transfer of $4.553 billion for patents applied for in 1988). Meanwhile, U.S. foreign aid in 1995 totaled
$12.3 billion, and U.S. foreign aid has more than doubled (in real-dollar terms) since the mid-1990s. See
CURT TARNOFF & MARIAN LEONARDO LAWSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., FOREIGN AID:
AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 29–31 tbl.A-2 (Feb. 10, 2011). These figures
suggest that even if TRIPS were entirely eliminated, the United States could easily offset the distributive
consequences of that (dramatic) reform by reducing its foreign aid outlay.
240 See McCalman, supra note 239, at 179 tbl.4 (calculating that Canada, Brazil, and the United
Kingdom were the biggest net losers—in absolute terms—from the transition to TRIPS).
241 See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 350–51 (discussing the normative arguments for and
against a user-pays approach).
242 See McCalman, supra note 239, at 179 tbl.4.
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Critics of the international IP regime might respond that even though the
distributive consequences of international IP law can be offset through foreign aid,
political considerations make such offsets unlikely.243 After all, “more foreign aid”
is rarely a winning platform plank in a rich-world democracy.244 Yet those who
criticize international IP law on distributional grounds bear the additional burden
of showing that their preferred alternative—whether it be a global prize fund, a
global R&D organization, or some other mechanism—would yield a more
desirable distributive outcome. If wealthy producer nation-states have managed to
use international IP law to extract rents from consumer nation-states, what is to
prevent wealthy producer nation-states from using a global prize fund or a global
R&D organization to extract rents as well? Until critics of international IP law can
answer that question, the case against international IP law on distributive justice
grounds will be as uneasy as the case for international IP law on administrative
cost grounds.

Conclusion
Readers of our prior work might at this point expect a recantation. In an
earlier article, we advocated for “innovation policy pluralism,” arguing that a mix
of IP and non-IP incentives is in most cases preferable to exclusive reliance on IP
alone.245 Here, we defend (with qualifications) an international status quo that is
(with exceptions) principally oriented around IP. Are these two positions
inconsistent?
To the contrary, we think that our analysis of international IP law
strengthens the case for innovation policy pluralism at the domestic level. One
concern regarding the use of non-IP innovation incentives at the domestic level is
that nation-states that subsidize knowledge production through such mechanisms
will not be able to internalize the benefits that accrue to other states.246 In this
Article, we have offered several reasons why that concern is misplaced. As we
demonstrated in Part II, not all knowledge goods are global public goods—and
even for global public goods, nation-states may have strong incentives to subsidize
production through public finance mechanisms under certain circumstances. And
as we showed in Part III, nation-states that subsidize knowledge production
through non-IP incentives at the domestic level still can use international IP law to
secure partial compensation from consumer states. Meanwhile, international IP
Cf. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016) (noting, in the domestic context, that “political action costs” may stand in
the way of “efficient” redistributive schemes).
243

244 See Kevin Robillard, Poll: Most Only Want Foreign Aid Cuts, POLITICO, Feb. 22, 2013,
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/poll-most-only-want-foreign-aid-cuts-087948.
But
see
Everything You Need To Know About the Parties’ Platforms, From Taxes to Terrorism to the Environment, NAT’L
POST, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/everything-you-need-to-knowabout-the-parties-platforms (last updated Oct. 13, 2015) (noting that the Liberals, who went on to win a
decisive victory in the October 2015 Canadian federal election, promised to “[r]everse the decline in
foreign aid”).
245 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 310.
246 See id. at 367-68.
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law leaves consumer states free to experiment with non-price-based mechanisms
for allocating access to knowledge goods. And unlike IP at the domestic level,
international IP law need not lead to any deadweight loss from proprietary
pricing.247
In sum, international IP law does not direct nation-states as to how they
should incentivize innovation or allocate access to knowledge goods at the
domestic level. Instead, the role of the international IP regime is to set the size of
transfers from states that consume knowledge goods to states that produce them,
while leaving both consumer states and producer states with substantial autonomy
over the production and consumption of knowledge goods inside their own
borders. The international IP regime thus does not supplant nation-states as the
principal players in innovation policy. Rather, international IP law expands the
range of innovation policy possibilities that nation-states can explore.

This is not to say that international coordination around non-IP mechanisms is necessarily
misguided. It is only to say, as emphasized throughout, that international coordination on IP does not
stop states from adopting IP alternatives at the domestic level—and in some circumstances may make it
easier for states to do so.
247

